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No. 76-1484
ZURCHER

Cert to CA9 (Hufstedler,
Good~~in, East) (per
curiam
~ ~A~~~~ -~

..4:...

~ ~

v.

~7"~~ t:::J~s.b>,ta~~ >· ~

STANFORD Df.!;Y

~ ~jjMIJ _..R~"'f&rty .

No. 76-1600

Cert to CA9 (Hufstedler,
Goodwin, East)(per
curiam)

BERGNA

v.
Federal/Civil

STANFORD DAILY

-

Timely

offend the Fourth Amendment unless a magistrate has been presented
tvith a sworn affidavit establishing probable cause to believe that
a

subpo~na

duces tecum and, perhaps, a restraining order are im-

practical alternatives to a search.

CA9 also held that neither the

good-faith defense· of public officials nor the prosecutorial immunity
. is sufficient to bar an attorney's fee award against local police
and prosecutors who fail to include the appropriate information in
their search warrant affidavits.
2.

FACTS:

On April 9, 1971, Palo Alto police officers were

-

called to the Stanford University Hospital to remove some obstreperous protestors.

Some of the demonstrators attacked and injured nine

of the officers, some seriously.
tified.

Most of the attackers were not iden-

Two days later, photographs appeared in the Stanford Daily,

the student newspaper, which indicated that the photographer had been
in position to photograph the assaults.
prepared an affidavit, and . a
court judge issue a search
"""--

W'

One of the injured officers

d~puty distr~ct

warr~nt

attorney had a municipal

authorizing a search of the offices

----

\.

of the Stanford Daily for any photographs or film relevant to the
assault.

There was no suggestion that any member of the newspaper

staff had anything to do with the assaults.

However, the newspaper

had previously announced its intention to destroy evidence which
{ might be used to convict demonstrators.

Three officers executed

the warrant in a thorough 15-minute search.

Nothing was seized.

Resps the Stanford Daily, an unincorporated association, and
seven staff members then commenced this §1983 action in N.D. Cal.
(Peckham) against petrs the municipal court judge, the district

attorney and his deputy, the chief of police, the officer who swore
out the affidavit, and the officers who conducted the search.

Resps

asked the DC to declare the search unconstitutional and to enjoin
petrs from issuing or executing against the newspaper or its staffers
any future search warrants seeking mat.erials relating to newsgathering
operations.
ment.

l

The case was decided on resps' motion for summary judg -

The DC summarized resps' theory and its own view at the outset:
"The basic question in this case is whether third parties
those not suspected of a crime -- are entitled to the same, if
not greater, protection under the Fourth Amendment than those
suspected of a crime. More specifically, are law enforcement
agencies required to explore the subpoena duces tecum alternative before obtaining a search warrant against third parties
for materials in their possession? For the reasons set forth
below the Court holds that third parties are entitled to greater
protection, particularly when First Amendment interests are
involved. It is the Court's belief that unless the Magistrate
has before him a sworn affidavit establishing proper cause
to believe that the materials in question will be destroyed,
or that a subpoena duces tecum is otherwise 'impractical,'
a search of a third party for materials in his possession is
unreasonable per se, and therefor violative of the Fourth
Amendment." Pet. App. 14, 76-1600.
The DC relied heavily on Bacon v. United States, 449 F.2d 933

(CA9 1971), which held that it was improper to issue an arrest warrant
for a material, third-party witness unless the judicial officer had
"probable cause to believe that it may become impracticable to secure
his presence by subpoena."

Id. at 943 • . The DC thought it irrelevant

that Bacon was based solely on a federal statute and the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure, since "courts read the FedE?ral Rules of Criminal
Procedure as implementing Fourth Amendment protections, and a rather
strong presumption exists that the procedures mentioned in the Federal
Rules are required by the Fourth Amendment."

Pet. App. 19, 76-1600.

The DC also distinguished Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (holding that
warrants are properly directed to seize "mere evidence"), on the ground
that Warden was directed only to suspects of crime.
The DC next extolled the subpoena duces tecum.

Not only is it

less intrusive than a search, but it may be challenged by a motion
to quash.

The DC thought considerations of individual privacy pre-

eluded the unnecessary intrusion of a search where the "less drastic
means" of a subpoena exists.

Moreover, the DC found that the exclu-

sionary rule gives no meaningful protection to a third party against
an unlawful search.

Accordingly, the DC formulated the constitutional

rule:
"law enforcement agencies cannot obtain a warrant to conduct
a third-par ty search unless the magistrate has probable cause
to believe that a subpoena duces tecum is impractic al. Any
evidence that a subpoena is impractical must be present ed in
a sworn affidavit if the magistrate is to rely on it." Pet.
App. 26, 76-1600.
In determining the impracticability of a warrant, the DC thought
"the mere failure to respond to a subpoena duces tecum should not,
without more, be grounds for issuing a search warrant.

The normal

remedy for failure to respond to a subpoena is a contempt proceeding."
Pet. App. 27, 76-1600.

The threatened destruction or loss of evidence

could make a subpoena impracticable, the DC thought,' but only if it

J appears
f

the evidence will be lost despite any restraining order the

court could issue.
:;e.s

Finally, the DC concluded that search executed in newspaper offices

"

pose such serious dangers to First Amendment-protected newsgathering
that a third-party search of a newspaper office would be permissible
only on "a clear showing that 1) important materials will be destroyed

c

or removed from the jurisdiction; and 2) a restraining order would
be futile."

Pet. App. 33, 76-1600 (emphasis in original).

Concluding that there were no standing or mootness problems,
the DC declared the April 12 search unconstitutional.

l

1

It declined

\ to enjoin future searches, expressing confidence that petrs would
comply with the spirit of the declaratory judgment.
In later proc::dings, the DC awarded attorney's fees

---

~n

the

amount of $47,500, apparently under the private attorney general
rubr i c.

The DC rejected petrs' good-faith and immunity defenses as

inapplicable to attorney's fee awards; it further noted that under
California law any attorney's fee would be paid by the public, and
not by the officer involved.

Nevertheless, judgment was entered a-

-

gainst all petrs in their individual capacities -- except the munici-

(_

'"'--

____,

pal court judge, who resps had earlier dismissed with prejudice.

--------CA9 affirmed,

adopting the DC opinion.

The CA took note of the

intervening decision in Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. The Hilderness
Society, 421 U.S. 240, which had invalidated the private attorney
general concept.

But the CA went on

+o

find that the Civil Rights

Attorney's Fee Awards Act of 1976 had revalidated the award for all
legal services rendered in the case, because the case was pending on
appeal at the date of enactment.

1/

~
\

..

The DC found resps' earlier threats to destroy evidence
an inadequate justification for obtaining a warranto Most obviously, none of this had been presented to the magistrate.
But even had it been, the DC ruled, a subpoena duces tecum
was still the proper course •

3.

CONTENTIONS:

in 76-1600)

~ay

Petrs (the police in 76-1484, the prosecutors

CA9's ruling will destroy search and seizure as a law

enforcement technique.

They read CA9's holding to define a third

party as all persons unless the search warrant affidavit shows probable
cause to believe that the person has committed the crime to which the
search relates.

Petrs say this requirement will often be impossible

to meet even in those cases in which they do suspect the owner of
crime.

Petrs argue that an apparent non-suspect will often turn out

to be the criminal, who the subpoena will give a chance to destroy
evidence.

Too, unlike the search warrant, there is no judicial review

requirement for a subpoena; nor does the search warrant present the
Fifth Amendment problems which a subpoena might.

Finally, they note

that searches are generally conducted in an atmosphere which demands
prompt actiono

The cumbersome notice requirements of a subpoena

would slow investigative machinery.

Petrs also say there is no - basis,

after Branzbu.rg v. Hayes, to give newspap.e rs added protection.

l

Petrs also say that the attorney fee award voids the absolute
inununity >1hich prosecutors enj-oy under Imbler v. Pachtman; and that
in any event the Attorney's Fee Act cannot be applied retroactively.

Petrs in 76-1484 also argue that it is wrong to impose attorney's
fees on the chief of police, who could be liable only under a respondeat
superior theory.
4.

DISCUSSION:

impression.

The court below treated this as a case of first

It's probably more accurate to say, as petrs do, that

----- -

-----

this result is without precedent.

---

""'--- Petrs raise no mootness claims.

The DC found a live controversy

__.-------~

-I-

--~~----~----

arising from petrs' claims that they would conduct this type .o f search
whenever the opportunity presented itself, and from resps' concomitant
assertions that the continued threat of future raids, when coupled
with the fact that one search had already occurred, presented a continuing burden on the paper's newsgathering operations.
One of the difficulties with this opinion lies in deciding who

\

is a suspect and who is a third party.

I do not find any standar d

by which CA9 proposes to distinguish between the two.

There is no

statement of the quantum of proof needed to be shown to elevate one
to suspect status.

But whether the test is probable cause for arrest,

as petrs contend, or something less, there is clearly much to petrs'
argument that it will be difficult to establish any proof in advance
of a search designed to obtain evidence of guilt.

Moreover, the

DC's standards for determining impracticability seem utterly unrealistic'o:.
Another disturbing point is that there is no indication that
CA9 recognizes any exigent circumstances which would excuse resort
to the magistrate altogether.

Its view seems to be that exigent

circumstances will justify a search warrant rather than a subpoena;
it is unclear whether CA9 would ever permit a warrantless search of
the premises of one who is not a suspect.
The less drastic

alternative approach, on which the opinion is

based, has not been employed in Fourth Amendmept analysis, in part
because police can't act with the deliberation of a legislative body.

-

It is probably unrealistic to expect law enforcement officers to be
able to .weigh all the factors which must be considered in deciding

..

-8-

whether a less drastic alternative is available.

In any event, there

is no need for a less drastic alternative when, as in this case, a
search is conducted pursuant to a warrant issued "upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describin g the place
\ to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."

Unless the

Warrant Clause is itself "unreasonable,''' no Fourth Amendment privacy
interests are threatened by a search performed according to its requirements; there is no constitutionally less drastic alternative.
I'm not sure whe ther the First Amendment test is dicta or ·a n
alternative holding of some sort.
Also interesting is the attorney's fee award, which I view as
an evasion of Imbler v. Pachtman and Pierson v. Ray.

-z:::

How police

officer s can be held liable for swearing to a truthful affidavit,
or for executing a judicial warrant proper on its face, is beyond me.
If there is to be liability, it should be limited to the issuing
magistrate.

It

The DC's refusal to permit even a good-faith defense

makes law enforcement officers strictly liable for the attorney's
fees of anyone whose constitutional rights are violated.
Resps have waived responses in both. cases.

5/30/77

Drinkwater

CA & DC ops in
petn appx.

(

\

PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM
June 9, 1977, Conference
List 1, Sheet 4
No. 76-1600

Cert to CA 9 (Hufstedler,
Goo dwin, East) ( pe:t: curiam )

BERGNA

v.
STANFORD DAILY

Federal/Civil

Timely

Pl ease see Preliminary M2morandum No. 76-1484.

5/30/7'1
tap

Dri nkwater

CA & DC ops

in

petn appx.

J?v-~~
~.~~

~

I I

\'

/l..,d..~

<::<-

~~J-~~~~ ~4-~
(e:t- ~~~~) 1 C/iet

~ ~ ~-~-"v- 21=~.

¥

aZZj ~

~~ · ~~~~~

~1-rJ)_~~~

~~~~~~.

~~~~£:t~~
•Jit:?C-

~~

September 18, 1977

~ J.. ~

EMORANDUM
To: Mr. Justice

~

From: Jim Alt
Re: No.76-1484, Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, and No.76-1600,
Bergna v. Stanford Daily
A response in opposition to cert, and a reply thereto,
have been filed.

The response contends the decision below

will not have the sweeping effects feared by petrs because it
is limited to third-party searches of newspaper offices, and
does not extend to all third-party searches. The response
points to the district court's refusal, after judgment in the
instant case, to enjoin a third-party search of some hospital
files.

Petrs reply that the district court did so without

2.

prejudice to the hospital's right to raise a Fourth Amendment
claim in another action. And in any event, CA9 did not limit

I

its opinion to searches of newspaper offices.
Respondents also contend that the issue of whether
declaratory relief may be granted against petrs without a
finding of bad faith, and the issue of whether the Civil
Rights Attorneys' Fees Awards Act of 1976 applies to actions
pending on appeal at the time of its passage, do not warrant
review by this Court.
DISCUSSION: I cannot help but think that this is as much
a Fourth Amendment case.

a First Am

" 'Historically the struggle for freedom of speech and press
in England was bound up with the issue of the scope of the
search and seizure power.' "United States v. United States
District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313-314 (1972), quoting Marcus
v. Search Warrant, 367

u.s.

717, 724 (1961). Even if one

viewed the holding below as limited to newspaper offices
which is difficult to do on the papers before us
would be an important one.

the case

I concur in your initial reaction

of "probably grant."
I note that the general issue of third-party searches may
be considered in reaching a decision in United States v. New
York Telephone Co., No.76-835. See my bench memo in that case
at 26-27.

Because the issue is not the central one in that

case, and because of the very different context in which it
arises in the instant case, I doubt whether this case should
be held for that one.
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CHAMBERS OF"

December 12, 1977

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

RE:

I

(76-1484 - Zurcher v. Stanford Daily
(

(76-1600

Bergna v. Stanford Daily

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:
Lewis has just mentioned to me the desirability of having
the Solicitor General file a brief amicus curiae in the
above case.
~

No application for leave to file a brief amicus curiae has
been made.
It seems to me that it would be helpful to have
the Solicitor General's views.
I suggest that we invite him
to file a brief. This case is slightly more than one month
from argument and this should give them sufficient time.
Absent dissent by Wednesday, we will make this request.

Regards,

i

December 12,

Dear Chief:

'

.:::{~; ~'"-lt:

Over the weekend I took at look at some of
briefs in the above case which is set for argument,
believe, in January • ... ~,~····'·
lr

This is the case involving the issuance
search warrant against the Stanford student newspaper. In
a subsequent suit against the magistrate who issued the
warrant, the prosecuting attorney who requested it, and
the police officers who served it, the federal district
court granted declaratory judgment relief and awarded
attorney's fees of $47,000. The DC's decisions,
substantially adopted by CA9, held - in effect - that
before a search warrant could be issued against a "third
party" (as distingujshe~ from a suspect) there must be
probable cause to believe that a subpoena duces !~2um_
would not have served the purpose.

'i;. ;\:.

j;. ,.

""''
[l

<

~

The federal courts in California also rejected
claims to immunity (except for the judge), holding that
attorney's fees were appropriate - without regard to
immunity - where the only relief sought was for a
declaratory judgment and an injunction.

'i!<i

As of this date, we have no brief amicus from the
Solicitor General. All of the briefs are not yet in, and
it may well be that we will hear from the SG prior to
argument. In view, however, of the importance of this
case to law enforcement generally, I think it would be
helpful to the Court to have the views of the SG.

' ··r

:~'~-

My file does not indicate that these have
requested. I wonder what you think about this?
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice

~uprmu <!faurt

ttf tqt ~nitelt j)tattG
<!}. 2.0~J!.~

~asfringimt.. ~.

CHAMBERS OF'

JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE

December 13, 1977

Re:

Nos. 76-1484 & 76-1600 - Zurcher v. Stanford
Dail

Dear Chief:
The views of the Solicitor General would
very likely be useful; but even if he has the
time to prepare them prior to argument, the
parties would very likely not have time to respond
in writing or to prepare an intelligent oral
response.

Perhaps we should anticipate supple-

mental briefing after argument if requested.
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
Copies to Conference

~u:pumt <!feud

of Urt ~nittb ,jtatts

~as!p:ttgtcn. ~. <!f. 2ll~J.I.~

CHAMBERS OF

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

December 15, 1977

Re:

(76-1484 - Zurcher v. Stanford Daily
(

(76-1600 - Bergna v. Stahford Daily

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE
There being a "negative" or "silent" majority
to ask the Solicitor General (with a response of
course) for an amicus memo, the Clerk is proceeding
via telephone request.
This will be by way of
typewritten submission provided readable copies
are filed.
If necessary, a response to the Solicitor
General could be filed post argument.

GJ;ards,
. <)

cc;

The Clerk
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM, 1977

vl~~..,."""""'"""""........"" ~ ,)4..-..-~,v c~ -11
~ AMES

ZURCHER, ET AL., PETITIONERS

~ ~v. • Pt.t - li!f

THE STANFORD DAILY, ET AL.

~~ ~ ~ ~~4·4~ ~-~~~17 .
LOUIS P. BERGNA, ET AL . , PETITIONERS

~ JLo ~(IS~~.
THE STANFORD DAILY, ET AL.

-

s~
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM, 1977

No. 76-1484
JAMES ZURCHER, ET AL., PETITIONERS
v.

THE

STill~FORD

DAILY, ET AL.

No. 76-1600
LOUIS P. BERGNA, ET AL., PETITIONERS
v.

THE STANFORD DAILY, ET AL.

ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES AS AMICUS CURIAE

This brief is filed in response to the Court's request,
received on December 15, 1977.
QUESTIONS PRES.ENTED
1.

Whether a search of the

office of a party not suspected

of a crime, in particular, a search of the office of a student
newspaper, pursuant to a warrant supported by probable cause,
is unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, unless before conducting the search, law enforcement officers have attempted by

4 :

subpoena duces tecum to obtain the materials they seek or have
demonstrated to a magistrate that a subpoena would be impractical.
2.

Whether the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Award Act

authori zes the award of fees in this case, although the services
compensated were performe d before the Act became law.
- 1 -

It

- 2 STATEMENT
1.

Shortly before 6 p.m. on April 9, 1971, officers of

the Palo Alto Police Department went to the Stanford University
Hospital in response to a request from the hospital director
that the police remove a group of demonstrators who had occupied
the administrative offices of the hospital since the previous
afternoon (A. 170-171, 176-177, 180-182).

When the police

arrived, they found that the demonstrators had chained and
barricaded the glass doors at both ends of the hall adjacent
to the administrative office area (A. 172).

After a series

of unsuccessful attempts to persuade the demonstrators to leave
peacefully, police officers took forcible

measures to gain entry

through the doors at the west end of the corridor (A. 170-171,
177-178, 180, 182).

A number of reporters, photographers

and bystanders gathered at that end of the hall to watch the
_])
police evacuation efforts (Pet. App. 12).
As the police
broke through the barricade blocking the west doorway, a
number of demonstrators, armed with sticks and clubs, rushed
out of the doors at the east end of the corridor and attacked
a contingent of nine police officers positioned there.

All

nine officers were injured in the ensuing struggle, some
seriously (A. 34, 104, 172-175, 179; Pet. App. 11).

The

police were able to identify only two of their assailants
(A. 175, 179; Pet. App. 12).
On Sunday, April 11, 1971, respondent, The Stanford
Daily ("Daily"), a newspaper published by students at Stanford
University (A. 16), published a special edition containing
articles and photographs devoted to the hospital protest
and the violent clash between demonstrators and police (A. 20,
_1/ The appendices to the petitions in these consolidated
cases are identical, even as to pagination. \Vhere it is
necessary to refer to the petitions separately, the petition
in No. 76-1484 will be cited as "Zurcher Pet." and the petition in No. 76-1600 as "Bergna Pet."

- 3 -

34-35, 100-116, 152).

The published photographs carried the

byline of a member of the Daily's staff (A. 35), and indicated that the Daily's photographer had been stationed
near the scene of the assault upon the officers at the east
end of the hospital hallway (A. 152-153; Pet. App. 12).

On April 12, 1971, the Santa Clara County District
Attorney's office secured a warrant authorizing an
search

immediate

of the Daily's offices for negatives, film, and

pictures showing the events and occurrences at Stanford
University Hospital on the evening of April 9, 1971 (A. 3132; Pet. App. 12).

The police officer's affidavit presented

to the issuing magistrate in support of the warrant contained
no evidence or allegation that any member of the Daily staff
was involved in the unlawful activities at the hospital (A.
33-35; Pet. App. 12).
At approximately 5:45 p.m. the same day, the search
warrant was executed by four members of the Palo Alto Police
Department (A. 72-75, 130-132, 136-141, 155-169).

According

to the police officers, the search lasted about 15 minutes
(A. 158, 162, 165, 169).
photograph
baskets.
157, 165).

\

The police examined the Daily's

laboratory, file cabinets, desks, and wastepaper
Locked drawers and rooms were left undisturbed (A. 141,
Petitioners and respondents disagree over whether

the police officers read or scanned any of the written materials
located in the Daily's offices at the time of the search (A. 75,
132, 140-141, 157, 164-165, 168).

Although the officers were

apparently in a position to see reporters' notes containing
information given in confidence, the police were not advised
by Daily staff members present during the search that any of
the materials examined were confidential in nature (A. 88, 132,

- 4 158, 161, 165, 168-169).

The search apparently uncovered

no useful photographs of the April 9 altercation Qetween
police and demonstrators, and the officers departed without
seizing any property (A. 27, 43, 53).
2.

On May 13, 1971, respondents commenced a civil

action in the United States District Court for the Northern
District of California seeking declaratory and injunctive
relief under 42 U.S.C. 1983.

Respondents alleged that the

search of the Daily's offices had deprived them, under color
of state law, of rights secured by the First, Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution (A.
15-35).

The district court granted respondents' motion for

a declaratory judgment that the

~earch

of the Daily's offices

was illegal; the court denied the request for injunctive
relief (Pet. App. C; 353 F. Supp. 124).
The district court held that, before obtaining a search
\varrant for materials in the possession of a so-called "third
party," i.e., a party not suspected of crime, law enforcement
officials are required under the Fourth Amendment to demonstrate
to the issuing magistrate not only probable cause to believe
that the third party has in his possession evidence of a crime,
but also probable cause to believe that a subpoena duces tecum
\-lould be an impractical means to obtain that evidence (Pet. App.
26).

The court further stated that even where a subpoena is

issued and

~he

requisite materials are not produced, the mere

failure to comply would not by itself constitute grounds sufficient
J

to support issuance of a search warrant (Pet. App. 27).

lI

Noting that destruction of evidence is a crime under
California law, the court suggested that a restraining order
would be the appropriate procedural device to use in the event

_

---

~~ ·~ . ,.....,..,. _

l
_

t

ssp;

~·

I

- 5 police presented evidence that materials needed for a
criminal investigation were in danger of destruction or
removal from the jurisdiction (Pet. App. 27).

The court

declared that a subpoena should be found impractical and a
search warrant issued for materials in the possession of a
non-suspect third party "[o ]nly if it appears that the materials
will be destroyed or removed from the jurisdiction despite the
restraining order, or that

ther~

simply is not time to obtain

a suitable order" (Pet. App. 28).
Finally, the court observed that in assessing the impracticality vel non of a subpoena, the magistrate "should consider

,., *

·k

whether First Amendment interests are involved" (Pet.

App. 28) .

A search of a newspaper office, the court said,

"presents an overwhelming threat to the press's ability to
gather and disseminate the news" (Pet. App. 32).

In addition,

the court opined, necessary information may be obtained from
the press by means less drastic than a search.

Therefore,

the court concluded, "[a] search warrant should be permitted
only in the rare circumstance where there is a clear showing
that (1) important materials will be destroyed or removed
from the jurisdiction; anQ (2) a restraining order would be
futile" (Pet. App. 33).
that any member

Since petitioners had not alleged

of the Daily staff was suspected of a crime,

the court e xplicitly refused to consider whether the same
rule should apply in such a situation (Pet. App. 33 n. 15).
On the basis of the undisputed facts,
the search of the Daily's

the court ruled that

offices was unlawful (Pet. App.

·- 6 -

_1_1
33, 35).
I

On August 10, 1973, the district court concluded that

I

an award of attorneys' fees to respondents was appropriate to
encourage vindication of important constitutional rights
App. 49-50).

(Pet.

The court later determined that $47,500 would

constitute reasonable compensation for the services performed
(Pet. App. 59-71).
The court of appeals affirmed, adopting the opinion of the
district court on the Fourth Amendment issue (Pet. App. A, 550
F. 2d 464).

With respect to the award of attorney's fees,

the

court of appeals noted that this Court's decision in Alyeska
Pipeline Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, which held
that attorney's fees could not ordinarily be awarded by federal
courts absent congressional authorization, invalidated the
district court's nonstatutory basis for its award.

However,

the court of appeals held that the intervening passage of the
Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C.
(Supp. V) 1988, which authorized federal courts to award fees
in cases filed under 42 U.S.C. 1983, "revalidated" the district
court's judgment awarding fees (id. at 6).
I.

ARGUNENT
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT DOES NOT REQUIRE A
SHOWING THAT A SUBPOENA IS IMPRACTICAL
BEFORE A WARRANT MAY ISSUE TO SEARCH
PREMISES OCCUPIED BY A NON-SUSPECT
THIRD PARTY.

Petitioners challenge the following rule, formulated by
the district court and endorsed by the court of appeals:

"law

enforcement agencies canna t obtain a warrant to conduct a thirdparty search unless the magistrate has probable cause to believe
2/ The court noted that a Santa Clara County grand jury had
convened on the evening of April 12, 1971, soon after the search
\varrant was executed.
The court was plainly under the impression
that local authorities could have issued the DaZ~y a subpoena returnable before that grand jury (Pet. App. 13-1
. In an affidavit
submitteri to the district court , however, petitioners sought to
demonstrate that a subpoena would have been futile under the
circumstances of this ca se.
The affidavit alleged that in
October 1969 photographs subpoenaed from the Daily had been
reported lost or stolen, and that sometime prior to April 1971
the Daily had announced in an editorial that it would not retain any potentially incriminating photographic materials (A.
150-152; see A. 117-118 (Daily editorial, February 10, 1970)).
The court remained unpersuaded, remarking first that the
(Continued)

I

- 7 that a subpoena duces tecum is irnprac tical" (Pet. App. 26) .
This broad holding constitutes a significant and ill-conceived
departure from established Fourth Amendment principles.

Neither

the language of the Amendment, nor the history of its drafting
and adoption, nor subsequent judicial interpretation of its
privisions supports the imposition of this additional prerequisite for the issuance of a valid search warrant.

Moreover,

the substantial practical difficulties that would attend the
administration of such a requirement counsel against its
acceptance by this Court.
A.

The Ruling Below Conflicts with Traditional Interpretations
of the Fourth Amendment.
The Fourth Amendment declares:
The right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by
oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.

The Amendment thus places important restrictions on the issuance
of search warrants.

A neutral magistrate must determine, on

the basis of sworn allegations, whether a sufficient showing
has been made to justify the invasion of privacy that a search
or seizure entails.

The place to be searched and the persons

or things to be seized must be specifically described in the
warrant, in order to protect asainst unfettered police inspection
of a person's horne, office, or belongings.
States, 275 U.S. 192, 196.

Harron v. United

By the same token, the magistrate's

participation in the warrant process provides an opportunity for

Footnote 2 (Con tinued) :
affidavit did not establish probable cause to believe that a
subpoena was impractical, and second that the evidence allegedly
establishing such probable cause had not been properly presented
to the magistrat e in affidavits supporting issuance of the
search warrant (Pet. App. 33 n. 16).

--- -. ·- -------=
- 8 the imposition of salutary limits on the manner and extent
of an authorized search. Finally, the warrant itself assures
one whose property is subjected to search or seizure that the
executing officer is operating under lawful authority .
v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 532.

Camara

This Court has recognized

repeatedly that these guarantees do afford meaningful safeguards against overreaching conduct by law enforcement officers.
See,

~.g.,

United States v. Chadwick, No. 75-1721, decided

June 21, 1977, slip op. at 7-8; United States v. United States
District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 316-317; Coolidge v. New Hampshire,

403 U.S. 443, 467 (plurality opinion); Johnson v. United States,
333 U.S. 10, 14; Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282

u.s.

344, 356-357.
Nowhere in the Fourth Amendment, however, is it stated or

-------

implied that a sworn demonstration of the impracticality of a

~
subpoena
is a precondition for the issuance of a valid search
warrant.

This is not surprising in light of the history of

the constitutional provision.

That history, frequently can-

vassed in the opinions of the Court, reveals that ''[t]he
Amendment was primarily a reaction to the evils associated
with the use of the general warrant in England and the writs
of assistance in the Colonies."

482.

Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465,

See also United States v. Chadwick, supra, slip op. at 6,

and cases there cited.

The principal concern motivatin8 the

Framers of the Amendment was a desire to narrow and particularize
the permissible scope of search warrants, in order "to prevent
arbitrary and oppressive interference by enforcement officials
with the privacy and personal security of individuals."
States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 554.

United

No attempt was

made to rank, according to the degree of their intrusiveness,
the various procedural devices that police might

e~ploy

in

I

- 9 their efforts to acquire information relevant to the investiga~

tion of crime.

fortiorari, the Framers imposed no requirement

that law enforcement officers limit themselves to the least
instrusive means by which necessary information might conceivably

_]j
be obtained.

Rather, the Framers addressed themselves solely

to searches and seizures, and struck a balance whereby "when
the State's reason to believe incriminating evidence will be
found becomes sufficiently great, the invasion of privacy
becomes justified and a warrant to search and seize will issue."
Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 400.
A study of the origins of the Fourth Amendment discloses
no intention to create separate and distinct categories of
persons to whom varying measures of constitutional protection
would apply, and the lower courts' differentiation in this case
between suspects and non-suspects finds no support in the
historical development of search and seizure law.

One respected

commentator has stated without qualification that "a warrant
may issue to search the premises of anyone, without any showing
that the occupant is guilty of any offense whatever."

T. Taylor,

Two Studies in Constitutional Interpretation, 48-49 (1969).
Similarly, this Court has said several times that the Fourth
Amendment was designed to protect everyone, "both the innocent
and the guilty."

Trupiano v. United States,

33L~

U.S. 699, 709.

See also ·Hyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 317; Camara v. Hunicipal
Court, 387 U.S. 523, 530; HcDonald v. United

State~,

335 U.S.

451, 453; Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, supra, 282
U.S. at 356.

On all these occasions, whether in a civil or

criminal context, the Court has not advanced the slightest
suggestion that the Fourth Amendment warrant requirements
3/

See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, supra, 428 U.S. at 557
12 ("Th e logic of such elaborate less-restrictive-alternative
arguments could raise insuperable barriers to the exercise of
virtually all search and seizure powers").

TI.

.I

I

l

i
f

l

- 10 should be administered differently for suspects and nonsuspects.
In the only recent judicial decision other than the instant
case to consider the matter directly, the Sixth Circuit
specifically rejected the argument that the Fourth
Amendment rights of innocent third parties are violated when
the government fails to utilize a subpoena duces tecum or
establish its impracticality before applying for a search
warrant.

....

In United States v. Manufacturers National Bank, 536

..

F.2d 699 (C.A.

6), certiorari denied sub nom. Hingate v. United

States, 429 U. S. 1039, a g ents of the Fede ral Burea u of Investigation obtained a warrant to search a bank safety deposit box

f

registered in the names of the wife and daugher of the man
the agents suspected of heading a large illegal gambling
operation.

After the warrant had been executed and the agents

had discovered more than $500,000 in currency, the lessees of
the safety deposit box moved for return of the seized property.
In affirming the district court's denial of the motion,
the court of appeals held that the warrant was supported by
probable cause and that no Fourth Amendment violation had
occurred.

Expressly disagreeing with the district court's

d e cision in this case, the court concluded (536 F.2d at 703):

l

Once it is e stablished that probable
cause exists to b e lieve a federal crime
has been committed a warrant may issue for
the sear~ of an! RrOEer; y wh lch t h e magistra t e fi as-prob ao e cause to believe may be
the place of concealment of evidence of
the crime.
The necessity that there be
findin g s of probable cause as to two
factors--the commission of a crime and
the loc a tion o E evidence--affords protec tio n from unreasonabl e sear che s an d
seiz ures, which are th e onl y on es forbid den b y the Fo ur th Amendment . ~/

I

.I
J

I

I
I

4/
See also People e x rel. Car ey v. Covelli, 61 Ill. 2d 394,
336 N.E. 2d 759 upholdin g validit y of warrant to search belongin g s of deceased third party).

·---

- 11 Respondents cite four state cases, none more recent than
1939, in support of their contention that the impracticality
of a subpoena must be established before a third party search
warrant

m~y

properly issue.

As the opinion below reveals,

these cases do not stand for the proposition asserted by
respondents.

In Owens v. Way, 82 S.E. 132 (Ga. 1914), the

police officers sought to justify a warrantless search of a
third party's premises and seizure of his safe by arguing that
the safe contained evidence that could be used to convict the
third party's nephew, whom the police had arrested pursuant
to a valid warrant.

The Georgia Supreme Court simply held that

the officers' authority under the arrest warrant did not extend
so far as to permit seizure of third party property.

Newberry

v. Carpenter, 107 Mich 567, 65 N.W. 530 (1895), involved a court
order authorizing a local prosecutor to seize the remnants of
two boilers that had exploded, destroying the printing plant
in which they were located and causing death or injury to
numerous persons.

Not only was the court order issued on the

basis of unsworn allegations, but also the prosecutor's actions
did not fall within one of the several categories of permissible,
seizures explicitly sanctioned by state statute.

Hence, in

neither case was the search and seizure invalidated by virtue
of the court's conclusion that a constitutional provision
governing searches should be interpreted to differentiate
between suspects and non-suspects.

The other two cases cited

..

by respondents, People v. Carver, 172 Misc. 820, 16 N.Y.S. 2d
268 (Ct y. Ct. 1939), and Commodity Manufacturing Co. v. Moore,
198 N.Y.S. 45 (Erie Cty . 1923), are also not

in point.

The

seizures in those cases failed to survive judicial scrutiny
either because they were authorized under state statute or
because they involved "mere evidence," as opposed to fruits or
instrumentalities, of crime.

This latter dubio us Fourth

Amendment distinction was eventually abandoned by this Court in

.J

...

- 12 -

_1_1
Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S.

294.

In short, existing Fourth Amendment jurisprudence amply
demonstrates that the constitutional standard for the issuance
of a search warrant is met when the magistrate is furnished
with probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed
and that evidence of that crime will be uncovered in a
particular location.

The protections of the Amendment

do not vary \vith the identity of the party whose premises
are to be searched or with that party's status as a suspect

6/
or non-suspect-.- Indeed a warrant may validly issue even
where the identity of the owner or occupant of the premises
is unknown.

See,~··

United States v. Besase, . 521 F. 2d

1306, 1308 (C.A. 6); Hanger v. United States, 398 F. 2d 91,
99 (C.A. 8),

certiorari denied,

393 U.S. 1119.

This result

is both expected and correct, because, as one prominent
commentator ha s explained, "[a] search warrant does not run
against an individual, · but to things in place.s" T. Taylor
.
1
supra, p. 60 (footnote omitted).
Kahn, 415 U.S.

See also United States v.

143, 155 n. 15.

5/
Respondents also cite (Br. 46) several "due process"
cases in which this Court has held some type of prior hearing
must be afforded a citizen before he may be deprived of his
property by the government.
These cases are plainly inapposite,
however, not only because they did not involve the lawfulness
of police conduct during a criminal investigation but also because,
unlike the procedures there under attack, the issuance of a
search warrant does require that a substantial prior showing
be made before a neutral magistrate.

I

6/
The courts below, relying on Bacon v. United States, L~49
r2d 933 (C.A. 9), have attempted to draw an analogy between an
arrest of a material witness and a search of the premises of a
non-suspect third party . The comparison is misguided for two
reasons.
First, it is doubtful whether the rules regarding
the arrest of material witnesses are constitutionally compelled.
See Rule 46(b), Fed. R. Crim. P.
Second, an arrest and a search
are notably disparate in their respective impacts on the
individual.
Predictably, therefore, the criteria governing
arrests and searches have never been equated in constitutional
law.
See Noto, Search and Seizure of the Media: A Statutory,
Fourth Amendment and First Amendment Analysis, 28 Stan. L. Rev.
957, 995-996 and nn. 222-224 (1976).

• I
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I

B.

The De cision Below Ove rlooks Significant Difficulties
and Costs As sociate d With Its "Third Party" Subpoena
Rul e.

I
-I
!

The sta t e ment of the bro a d rule adopted b y the
d e ci s ion below is deceptively simpl e , but the rule masks a

-

my riad of probl e ms that we b e lieve would inevitably arise in
t h e course of its application and that did not receive adeq uate consideration in the opinion.

Because of these prob-

l e ms, we submit that it would not be wise to adopt the innovation in Fourth Amendme nt law propounded by the decision
below, even assuming the Court considers itself unconstrained
by t he l a ck of prec e d e nt or textual support fo r the rule.
In conducting a pragmatic inquiry into the desirabilty
of a rule requiring an antecedent magisterial determination
of the impracticality of a subpoena as a precondition to the
issuance of a warrant to search premises belonging to a nonsuspect, it is necessary to balanc e the frequency and severity
o f the evils against which such a procedure would guard with
th e practical costs that the procedure would impose.
believe that t he evil,

We

while p e rhaps significant in occasional

sp ecific cases, is not in fact prevalent -- a conclusion sup p orte d to some extent by the striking paucity of reported
cases challeng in g the propriety of warrant e d, probable caus e
sea rches of "third party" premis e s.
It i s , moreove r, in the nature of things tha t unne c essary or un j ustifiabl e s e arches of trul y disint e r est ed
th ird pa rtie s are ra re .

We c a nvas s e d a number o f fe d e r a l

prosec utors ' offi c es i n c onn e ctio n with the prepa r at ion o f
this brief and we r e consis t e ntl y t o ld th a t t h ere i s a stron g
preferen2e f o r proceeding by subpoena o r , better ye t, b y i nformal request rather tha n by search wh enever it appears
feasible to do so (which i s almost always in th e c ase o f
ind i spu ta bly d isi nt ereste d thi r d p arti e s s uch a s b a nks or

I

""-...-,

-

telephone companies).

lL~

-

This prefence is predictable and under-

standable in light of the fact that the warrant mechanism
is relatively cumbersome and demanding and that searches perceived as unnecessary by the citizenry can be destructive of
police-community relations -- considerations that make law
enforcement officials unlikely to seek a warrant in the first
instance unless they have some reason to fear that less drastic
measures will prove inadequate.

Respondents themselves cite

(Br. 44) cases that exemplify prosecutors' tendency to subpoena
files and records rather than attempting to obtain such
materials through a judicially-authorized search.

Since the

prosecutor's own interest in the efficient gathering of evidence
militates in favor of reliance upon the voluntary cooperation
of neutral third parties, it is reasonable to commit the
original determination whether to proceed by subpoena or search
warrant to those executive officials charged with law
enforcement responsibilities.
Hhile the evils perceived as justifying the decision
below are thus not ubiquitous, the practical difficulties
surrounding its implementation promise to be substantial.
Foremost among these is the classification of particular
persons as suspects or non-suspects.

We are particularly

concerned in this connection with the implication in the
opinion below -- arising from its use of the analogy to arrests
(Pet. App. 25-26) -- that it may intend to encompass within the
otherwise undefined concept of "third parties" any person
as to whom there is no probable cause to believe he or she
is criminally implicated in the offense under investigation.
If any new restriction is to be imposed upon the procedures

- 15 antecedent to third party searches, it is imperative that the
"third party" concept be strictly limited to persons or
organizations indisputably free of any culpable connection
with the offense or relationship to possible offenders.
The need of police officers to inspect or seize items of
private property arises in a vast variety of situations.

At

time , prosecutors and police may be certain that a given crime
has been committed but may not yet have reached the point of
,'

having probable cause for an arrest or perhaps may not even
have identified any suspects.

In such circumstances, police

would be hard-pressed to demonstrate that a subpoena is an
impractical method of obtaining materials from any particular
party.

At the same time, the use of subpoenas that the courts

below would require might well result in premature notice to
a guilty

individua~olice

may wish to inspect the

---------'--

premises or property of so-called third parties, not themselves
suspected of any complicity in the unlawful conduct under investigation, but known to be
likely perpetrator .

~ted

to, or friendly with, the

Similarl~ lice

may need to search areas

belonging to or occupied by presumably innocent third parties,
but to which a criminal suspect has or has had ready access.
See,

~.,

United States v.

~immons,

390 U.S. 377; United

States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48; United States v. Miguel, 340
F. 2d 812, 814 n. 2 (C.A. 2), certiorari denied,
United States v. Fernandez, 430 F. Supp.

79L~

382 U.S. 859;

(N.D. Cal.).

Where,

is often the case, the probable reaction of such third parties
to a subpoena or police inquiry is unknown and unknowable, the
r ule adopted by the cour ts below would create an
risk t h at va l uable evidence woul d b e lost.

' .·

unjustifiable

as

- 16The "subpoena first" rule will also require the frequent
inclusion of additional material in search warrant applications.
It will presumably be necessary in each instance to include,
in addition to the constitutionally required specific identification of the place to be searched and things to be seized,
some statement indicating the identity of the owners or occupants
of the place to be searched and relating what is known of
their connection to the crime and to any suspected perpetrators
of the crime -- information which, as indicated above, may not
always be readily available and which has not heretofore been
thought constitutionally required (see United States v. Kahn,
sunra, 415 U.S. at 155, n. 15).

And where premises of

someone arguably a "third party" are to be searched, prosecutors will confront the difficult task of presenting
reliable information on the speculative question of the
practicality of a subpoena.

The opinion below fails to

indicate what sort of evidence would suffice to satisfy this
requirement.

While such omissions from the analysis in the

opinion make it impossible to predict how heavy an additional
burden will be imposed on law enforcement officers by the
"subpoena first" rule, the concerns expressed above are ones
that must be reckoned with.
Apart from any burdens that may be imposed on the warrant
procedure itself, the analysis of the opinion below is deficient
in failing to consider the difficulties that may be associated
with reliance upon subpoenas in many circumstances.

As

petitioners have indicated (Bergna Pet. 6 n. 4, 8 n. 6; Berf,na
Br. 19-20; A. 153-154), the limited functions and availability
of g rand juries in California and other states

would severely

_]_/
Since the Fifth Amendment requirement of a grand jury
indictment for "capital, or otherwise infamous crime[s]" (see
Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 183; see also Rule 7(a),
Fed. R. Crim. P ., does not apply to the states under the Fourteenth Amendment, Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, cited
with approval in Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 633, the
de gr ee of reliance on, and thus availability of, grand juries
varies widely from state to state.
See Branzburg v. Hayes,
408 U.S. 665, 687-688 and nn. 24-25.

1: .

~ ~

--,
- 17 hamper prosecutorial efforts to use subpoenas to the extent
that the lower courts' decision seems to envision.

-

Likewise in

the federal system, the infrequent meetings of grand juries in
a significant number of sparsely populated or geographically
large districts

in some districts federal grand juries meet

as infrequently as once every 60 days -- make routine resort to
subpoenas highly problematical.

Prosecutors might often be

required to issue subpoenas returnable before a grand jury
that will not convene for several days or even weeks.

The delay

inevitably associated with this process is incompatible with
the imperatives of effective criminal investigation and the
societal interest in prompt resolution of criminal cases
reflected in the Speedy Trial Clause of the Sixth Amendment.
We do not mean by the foregoing to suggest that law
enforcement authorities should be in any way discouraged from
using subpoenas where feasible, or that there are no valuable
interests that are served when a subpoena is used rather than
a search, or even that there may not be occasions on which it
would be appropriate to refuse issuance of a search warrant
because it is unreasonable to proceed by those means rather
than b y subpoena or even a request for voluntary cooperation.
One undeniable benefit of a subpoena, whenever prompt compliance
is forthcoming,

is that it avoids the necessity for police

rummaging that may disclose private materials not subject to
inspection or seizure under the terms of the warrant.

(In

many cases a police request for voluntary production at the time
the war r ant is served could accomplish the same objective, but
that will not always be so ; here, for example, it appears
t hat t he pho t o g r a phs mi ght not hav e been p r oducible b e c a use they
did not exist a t the time o f the search.)

- 18Another cited benefit of the use of the subpoena is
that it affords the third party an opportunity to litigate
his obligation to supply the requested materials.

We recognize

that this may be valuable in cases where the subpoenaed party
can make a convincing showing that he does not possess the
requested materials or that they are subject to some overriding privilege, such as the attorney-client privilege, that
shields them from production even though they may contain
8/
evidence of a crime .-- But the opportunity to litigate prior

Litigation is a time-consuming process that is

to seizure or disclosure of the materials is not an unmixed
--------~

blessing.

incompatible with the need for expedition in the conduct of
criminal investigations.

Especially insofar as a party may

have objections to production or disclosure rooted in Fourth
Amendment considerations, the general liberality with which
grand jury subpoenas may be procured and enforced, and the very
limited nature of Fourth Amendment objections to them that our
legal system countenances, suggest that such objections will
ordinarily be found to lack merit.
9/
1317, 1324-1326 (1973).

See Note, 86 Harv. L. Rev.

8/
Respondents and the courts below apparently assume that if
a-subpoena for certain materials is quashed, those materials
could not then be obtained by means of a legitimate warranted
search. This is not necessarily so. For example, in recognition
of the colorable Fifth Amendment self-incrimination objections
which may be advanced against the active cooperation necessarily
involved in an affirmative response to a subpoena, this Court has
approved the use of search warrants for the acquisition of
certain materials the production of \vhich might not be subject
to compulsion by subpoena. See Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463;
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616. See also Fisher v. United
States, supra.
_21
Thus, although subpoenas are theoretically subject to
the Fourth Amendment requirement that the materials sought be
described wit h particularity, see Oklahoma Press Publishing Co.
v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 208-209; Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43,

(Continued)

- 19The courts below assigned great weight to the fact that
innocent third parties, subjected to an unlawful search but
not prosecuted on criminal charges, would have no occasion to
invoke the exclusionary rule to suppress evidence produced
by the illegal search.

Reasoning from this premise, they

decided that adoption of the prophylactic "subpoena first'' rule
\vas the only way to afford third parties "meaningful protection"
against unlawful searches (Pet. App. 23).
incorrect.

This conclusion is

As demonstrated above, substantial guarantees that

warranted searches will be lawful are provided by the requirements
of the warrant procedure itself.
an ~

not the

ex~l ~ ionar L ru ~e,

-

-

It is the Harrant Clause,

that is the principal protection

-

of the privacy rights of innocent citizens.

-.......

-

Furthermore,

persons aggrieved by violations of their Fourth Amendment
may in some cases initiate legal proceedings 1 including damage
actions, to vindicate those rights and deter future misconduct.
See 42 U.S.C. 1983; Bivens v. Six Unkno\VTI Named Agents, 403 U.S.

Footnote 9 (Continued) :
in practice the expansive scope of the grand jury's investigative
power has been invoked to justify subpoenas of notably broad
reach.
See, ~, Brown v. United States, 276 U.S. 134;
Hheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478; In re Grand Jury
Subpoena Duces Tecum, 203 F. Supp. 575 (S.D.N.Y.); In re Borden
Co., 76 F. Supp. 857 (N.D. Ill.).
Moreover, issuance of a valid subpoena does not require a
probable cause showing that the materials sought constitute evidence of a
crime under investigation. The grand jury -- or the prosecutor acting alone
as agent for the grand jury -- may issue a subpoena with no prior judicial
scrutiny, and the corrrnands of the Fourth Arrendment will be found satisfied
by a demonstration of simple relevance of the materials sought to the subject
matter under consideration by the grand jury. See Oklahom Press Publishing
Co. v. ·Halling, supra, 327 U.S. at 208-209. The very staterrent of this test
r eveals one of the incongruities of the ruling below. The validity of a
subpoena is tested in part through an evaluation of its connection to an
ongoing grand jury inquiry. But, in rno£3t instances in which law enforcerrent
of ficials seek to acquire informtion, no grand jury investigation of the
matter is in progress. Either evidence gathering has not yet proceeded to
t he point where a prosecutor would present his case to a grand jury, or no
r equest f or a grand jury indictrrent is contemplated. Under such circ1.ID1Stances,
asstnning a grand jury were convened for the purpose of issuing the sort of
subpoenas that the courts belO\V would require, the test of relevancy to a
grand jury inquiry would be rreaningless.

I,
i

- 20 10/
388.-- Additional legal recourse is available through an action

-

for return of property wrongfully held by public officials.

See

Harden v. Hayden, supra, 394 U.S. at 307-308; Rule 4l(e), Fed. R.
Crim. P.
In sum, we submit that the courts below erred in concluding
that whenever third parties are involved, an additional procedural requirement -- demonstration of a subpoena's impracticality

----=----

-- is mandated by the Fourth Amendment's prohibition of unreasonable searches.

The reasonableness of searching premises

of third parties is most appropriately ensured not by a sweeping
~ prophylactic

~

modification of the traditional warrant procedures,

but by the sensitivity of executive and judicial officers to
the specific circumstances of each proposed search.

This Court

has recognized that, in search and seizure cases, "[t]he test
of reasonableness cannot be fixed by per se rules; each case
must be decided on its own facts."
428 U.S.

364,

South Dakota v. Opperman,

373, quoting with approval from Coolidge v. New

Hampshire, supra, 403 U.S. at 509-510 (concurring and dissenting opinion of Black, J.).

The initial assessment that a

warranted search is reasonable under all the circumstances
should be

and

currently is made

by executive officials

in the course of their decision to apply for a warrant.

That

assessment is ratif ied by a neutral magistrate when and if
he determines that a warrant should issue.
In addition, we emphasize that the magistrate remains

-

free to impose any special restrictions on the manner of the
~
~-------------vlarrant's
execution that
he believes are necessary to guarantee

the reasonableness of the authorized search.

lQI

In an appropriate

We recognize that damage actions will not always be an
a va ilable remedy because of the " good faith" defense, which is
es pecially potent in cases involving warranted searches.

I
f

- 21 case, for example, the magistrate may direct that police refrain
from searching particular areas until after an informal request
addressed to the owner or occupant has failed to inspire
production of the materials sought.

Finally, if in a given case

a party whose premises have been searched believes that the lack
of a

prior opportunity for voluntary cooperation rendered the

subsequent search unlavful, judicial remedies are available to
vindicate Fourth Amendment rights. See pp. 19-ZO, supra.

Those

remedies are properly applied on a case-by-case basis after
review of all the circumstances.

Proliferation of procedural

barriers to the issuance of warrants that f a ll into c e rtain
artifically created categories appears to us an unwise and
unworkabl e means of enforcing the Fourth Amen dmen t.

- 22 -

c.

The First Amendment Concerns Implicated in the Search
of a 1Ne; spaper Of f ice Do Not ~ ecess ilate Interposition
ot Addi ti o na l_ Pr~ cedural Obs ~cles to the Issuance of
Sea rch warrants.- - As is clear from the foregoing discussion, the

federal government's principal concern in this case arises
from the broad sweep of the decision below, which would alter
the existing procedures for securing evidence by warranted
search in cases involving a potentially large, albeit unde-

-

frii.ed, class of "third parties."

In the course of the opinion,

however, the courts below did indicate that adherence to the
"subpoena first" rule is especially important where First
Amendment interests are involved (Pet. App. 14, 28), and by
far the bulk of respondents' argument (Br. 11-40) on the merits
of their Fourth Amendment claim is devoted to a defense of the
rule promulgated by the courts below as
of a search of a newspaper office.

a~~lied ~ in : th~

context

We now turn, accordingly,

to a discussion of the question whether the Fourth Amendment
requires a general rule barring the issuance of a warrant to
search "press" premises in all cases in which it has not been
demonstrated to the magistrate that a subpoena or restraining
order would not succeed in securing production of the materials
being sought.
This Court has often acknowledged that the protection
of First Amendment liberties is an important element of the
law of search and seizure.
413

u.s.

496;

See, e.g., Roaden v. Kentucky,

Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476;

Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205;

u.s.

717.

A Quantitv of

Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367

Ind eed, widespread abhorrence for general warrants

authorizing indiscriminate search and seizure of private books
and papers, and concern for the impact of such actions on
f r ee dom o f expres sion, lie s a t th e v e ry origin of the Fourth
Amendme nt.

See Stanford v. Texas, sup ra, 379 U.S. at 481-

4 85;

Entick v. Carrington, 19 How. St. Tr. 1030, 95 Eng. Rep.

8 07;

Wilkes v.

~vood,

19 How. St. Tr. 1153, 98 Eng. Re p. 489;

- 23 T. Taylor, op. cit. supra, at 29-35.

"The Bill of Rights was

fashion e d against the background of knowledge that unrestricted
power of search and seizure could also be an instrument for
stifling liberty of expression."
supra, 367 U.S. at 729.

Marcus v. Search Warrant,

Certainly one may infer from the

foregoing authorities and consideration of the history of the
Fourth Amendment that where a search of newspaper offices is
cqptemElated, the readily identifiable First Amendment interests involved are entitled to thorough consideration.
In this regard, it should be noted at the outset
that federal law enforcement officials rarely if ever engage

~~------------~

been found in which any media facility has been searched
under federal auspices.

The solicitude of the federal govern-

ment for legitimate press interests is reflected in Justice
Department guidelines for the issuance of subpoenas to newsmen.
See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 706-707 & n.41.
guidelines, codified at 28 C.F.R. 50.10

These

(1976), provide that

informa- ~

"[a]ll reasonable attempts should be made to obtain

tion from nonmedia sources before there is any consideration
of subpoe naing a representative of the news media"
(b)).

(subsection

They further provide that" [n]egotiations with the media

shall b e pursued in all cases in which a subpoena is contemplated"

(subsection (c)) and that "no Justice Depa rtment

official shall request, or make arran g eme nt s for, a subpoe n a
to any me mb er o f the n ew s me dia wi t hout the exp re s s author i-

11/
za tion of the Attorney Ge neral"

(subsection (d)) . -

-----

Whi l e ··t be

g ui deli n es ar e s ilent on the sub j e ct of obta ining wa rrant s

to s earch n ews me dia pre mis e s, it may r e asonab ly be inferre d

lV Justi c e Depar tment record s revea l t hat t h e At to r ney
General a u tho r i ze d 23 s ubp o enas to members of t h e news media
in 1 9 76 a nd 17 in 1977.

I

- 24 from the policies relating to subpoenas that great
s im i larly b e exe rcised in the case of searches.
In lig ht of th e polic y d e t e rminations unde rlying the
guidelines and the histor y of rel e vant federal practices, it
can fairly be supposed th a t federal law enforcement efforts
would not be seriousl y hampered by a decision of this Court
approving the "subpoena first" rule of the courts below in
the limited context of searches of the press as a neutral
"tr:,_ird party" believed to be in possession of evidence bearing
upon a criminal investigation.
Nevertheless, the observation that such a rule would
not be d amagin g , or the conclus i o n tha t i t is g e n e r a lly a g o od
idea, does no t lead inexorably to the result that the rule is
constitutionally required, and we oppose the result of the.courts (,/
below insofar as it is embodied in an across-the-board modl-

--------------~--------~----~------------------------__.•
of

fication of the warrant procedure as applied to se
the press.

~odi;d
?(,''

We submit that the course selected by the Framers,

in the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment, de-

~n

~-.,..,
pends upon th e discretion of executive officers and, more im~-~_.........,._...,..,.,,.

~~ portant, upon the detached judgment of a neutral magistrate ~
~ \~

~-

to guarantee in the first instance that a warranted search

is reasonable under all the circumstances, including the

~

pos~

sible impact o f the proposed search on values protected by the
First Ame ndment.
Thu s , in a ct i ng upon an app lication for a warrant,

-

a ma gi st r at e may and s hould consider a numb er of fac t ors, in~

eludi n g th e natur e o f th e ite ms th a t the pol i c e inte nd to
seize , the n at u re o f t he pl a ce th a t th e pol i c e intend to search,
t h e i mpor t ance of th e mater ial s s o ught to o ve rall l a w e nforc ement efforts, an d even the n e c es s ity for p roceed i n g by sea rch
rather than by avai l able alternative means that may be l ess
in t ru sive on interests of p riva c y or fr ee d om of e x press i o n.
Fu rthermo re , the magist r a t e ma y r es trict or adjust t h e ma nne r
and c ond i t io ns of a warrant e d s earch in o rder to a v oi d u n n eces-

- 25 sary infringeme nt on privacy and other constitutionally protected values.
This Court has held in a First Ame ndment context
that "[a] seizure reasonable as to one type of material in
one setting may be unreasonable in a
respect to another kind of material."
supra, 413 U.S. at 501.

di~ nt

setting or with

Roade n v. Kentucky,

It has similarly indicated that a

search warrant's description of items to be seized may be impermissibly general when the items have potential First Amendment protection even though the same
ficiently particular for other items.
379 U.S. at 486.

de ~ption

might be suf-

Stanford v. Texas, supra,

Accordingly, where a prosecutor or police

officer seeks a warrant authorizing the seizure of material
involving some kind of expression, such as a photograph, and
where th e application further reveals that the search for that
material may well affect significant First Amendment activity,
such as the publication of a newspaper, the magistrate should
and ordinaril y will recognize that special care must be taken

----------~-------~------------------------~-----------in assessing
the reasonableness of the proposed search and
~
~
~
seizure. At a minimum, he should satisfy himself that the

-

1,

-

s earch is intended to achieve bona fide law enforcement aims

and is not designed to provide an opportunity for harassment.
These views are refl e cted in a rec e nt statement o f
this Court in Andresen v. Maryland, supra, 427 U.S. at 482
n.ll:
[T]her e are gr ave dan ge rs inh e r e n t in e xe cuting
a warr a nt a uth or i zing a s earch and s ei z u re of
a p ers on's pape rs * * *.
In s earc h es f o r p apers ,
it i s c e rt a i n that some innocuou s docu~ents
wil l be e xam in e d, a t l eas t curs ori l y , in o rder
t o d etermine wh e th e r the y are, in fac t, amo n g
tho se pap ers a u t ho r i ze d to be se ized .
* * *
[ R] espo n s i b l e off ici a l s , includ ing jud i c ia l
officia ls, must t ake car e to a ssure t hat [ suc h
searc h es ] are conduc ted in a ma n ner that mi n imizes u nwarranted i ntr u si ons u pon privacy.
Hee d ing th i s exh or tat i o n , a magis t ra te may s h ape and s tru c ture

- 26 a warranted search in a way calculated to render the search
reasonable.

In this connection he may, before authorizing a

search, require a showing that the desired material cannot
safely be sought by less intrusive means.

In extreme cases,

he may even conclude that although a warrant application fulfills the probable cause and particularity requirements of the
Fourth Amendment, no feasible restrictions on the manner of
execution of the proposed search would suffice to ensure its
reasonableness.

Under such circumstances, the magistrate

may simply decline to issue the warrant.
We submit that these protections, comprehended within
the traditional scope of a judicial officer's review of an

~ for authority to search, are the only ones mandated
application

----------------------------------------------

-----

-------------~

by the Constitution for safeguarding First Amendment freedoms
~

----

~

in the warrant process.

.......

This is not to say that the political

branches of government cannot or should not impose additional
restrictions on searches of media premises.

The executive may,

by regulation, install procedures requiring that press searches
receive the advance approval of high-ranking executive officials.
As a substitute or supplement, it may sharply circumscribe
the occasions upon which resort to such law enforcement tactics will be permitted.

Or it may choose informally to eschew

searches of press offices and to rely exclusively on alternate
means of acquiring information necessary for criminal investigations and prosecutions.

For its part, the legislature may
12/
enact similar restrictions on press searches .
~~

./'_

A recent study reports that 26 states have adopted legislation
conferring upon newsmen some degree- o f Statutory immunity from
subpoenas seeking the source or substance of information
acquired in the course of news gathering activities.
See Note,
supra,
28 Stan. L. Rev. at 960-061 and n.20; see also Comment,
Newsmen 's Privilege Two Years After Branzburf v. Hayes: The First
Amendment in Jeopardy, 49 Tul. L. Rev. 417, ~29 and n.lOO (1975).
A law of this kind is currently in effect in California.
Cal.
Evid. Code 1070 (West Supp. 1976).
(Continued)

- 27 The government's limited contention here is that no
such measures are constitutionally compelled.

Adoption of

the "subpoena first" rule, modified to apply only to searches
of media offices, would represent a judicial endorsement of
~

~

-

two classes of First Amendment
freedoms, one designed for the
,....
._..,._,
~

~

,...

~

majority of American society and one tailored specially for
the press.

Such a result would run counter to recent decisions

of this Court rejecting in different contexts assertions of a
newsmen's right to preferential treatment.

See,

~~

Branzburg

v. Hayes, supra; Pell v. Procurier, 417 U.S. 817; Saxbe v.
Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843.

I

Footnote 12 (Continued):
None of the so-called "reporter's shield"laws addresses
itself explicitly to the subject of searches of press offices.
Nevertheless, at least one commentator has suggested that some
shield statutes, and in particular the currently effective amended
version of California's law, might be read to cover both subpoenas
and searches. See Note, supra, 28 Stan. L. Rev. at 962-971.
Respondents themselves have acknowledged this argument without
fully embracing it. Br. 27-28 and n.l2.
The version of the California shield law in effect at the
time of the district court's decision in this case insulated
newsmen from adjudications of contempt based upon refusals "to
disclose the source of any information procured for publication
and published in a newspaper." Cal. Evid. Code 1070 (1967 ed.).
In 1974, the statute was amended to provide identical protection
for ne\vsmen' s refusals "to disclose any unpublished information
obtained or prepared in gathering, receiving or processing information for communication to the public." The phrase "unpublished
information" was broadly defined and would clearly cover the
photographs sought in this case. Cal. Evid. Code l070(c)
(West Supp. 1976). Nonetheless, the applicability of California's
shielded law to searches of news facilities remains problematical.
The statute guards against contempt adjudications for refusals
to disclose information "in any proceeding ·k ·k ~·, in which,
pursuant to law, testimony can be compelled to be given." Cal.
Evid. Code 1070 (West Supp. 1976), 901 (1967 ed.). Arguably,
a search is not such a proceeding. Cf. Andresen v. Maryland, supra.
In any event, the permissibility of the search here at issue
under present California law may be sufficiently debatable to
persuade this Court that this case is not an appropriate vehicle for
the announcement of an important constitutional rule.
I
Moreover, approval of a constitutional rule making satisfaction of extraordinary procedural requirements an obligatory
prelude to the issuance of valid warrants for press searches
would inevitably spawn knotty problems in determining when the
subject of a proposed search is sufficiently similar or related
to the mass media to invoke the special protection provided.

- 28 In their attempt to defend the rule fashioned by the
courts below, respondents rely heavily on the facts of this
case.

They stress (Br. 12) that in this case the affidavit

submitted in support of the search warrant did not allege that
any staff member of the Daily was suspected of criminal behavior.
They further observe (Br. 11-12) that the photographs sought
constitutued "mere evidence" of a crime rather than weapons,
contraband, or stolen property.

Moreover, probable cause to

believe that the photographs existed and that they were located
at the Daily's offices was produced not by independent police
investigation but by the Daily's o'vn publication of its April 11,
1971 edition, an activity plainly encompassed within First
Amendment freedoms.

Finally, the evidence sought was itself

communicative material deserving First Amendment protection.
On the basis of these facts, respondents maintain
that rejection of the decision below will produce a host of
consequences detrimental to press activities.

Valuable

sources of information who wish to preserve their anonymity or
confidentiality of their communications may refuse to deal with
newsmen.

Newsmen themselves will hesitate to record and save

their recollections of conversations and events, for fear that
later police searches will result in breaches of confidence.
Vigorous participation in the editorial process may be chilled
by the threat that subsequent searches will reveal unpopular
positions.
O'Vil

It is also suggested that news media may censor their

publications or programs in an effort to avoid creating the

impression that they possess materials of interest to law
enforcement officials.

Last but not least, a search itself may

so thoroughly disrupt ordinary media activity that a particular
edition or broadcast is delayed, damaged , or eliminated altogether.

- 29 As Justice White has accurately explained in his
opinion for the Court in Branzburg v. Hayes, supra, 408 U.S.
at 693-695, the empirical likelihood of any or all of these
occurrences is extremely difficult to predict.

In any

~
~--'---------------~-----·
event,
the probability
and severity of possible negative
effects on press interests will undoubtedly vary substantially
from case-to-case, as will the factual settings in which
search warrant applications are presented to magistrates.
observation suggests that the

~ ~

This

rule fashioned by the

courts below is poorly suited to ensuring that First Amendment
freedoms and legitimate law enforcement needs are properly
13/
accommodated.-

13/
The courts below did not comment upon the possible
interaction between state shield statutes and the "subpoena
first" rule.
Assuming that the impracticality of a subpoena
must be established before a valid search warrant may issue, a
serious question arrises concerning the impact of an
applicable shield law on a magistrate's impracticality determination.
It could be argued that the mere existence of such a
law should suffice to convince a magistrate that a subpoena
would be impractical, since no contempt sanction could be
imposed on a newsman choosing to disobey a judicial demand for
production of certain materials. A less extreme position
might be that the existence of an applicable shield statute
combined with one or more prior refusals by a particular media
representative to deliver information in response to a subpoena
should be enough to establish the impracticality of further
subpoenas to the same party. A third conceivable stance
would be that, in the absence of any indication that evidence
will be destroyed, a subpoena should be served before a search
is authorized, even where the magistrate has every reason to
believe that the newsman subpoenaed will rely on the shield
law to protect his noncompliance.
Interpretation and application
of the various state shield statutes are of course, exclusively
matters of state concern, and the federal government accordingly
expresses no views on the subject.
The issue raised in this footnote does, however, illustrate on set of problems likely to b e
created by adoption of the "subpoena first" rule in the press
context.

.

.

- 30 The argument that the Four th Amendme n t compr e h ends
protection of First Amendment interests within the case - b y -case
magisterial evaluation implicit in the Warrant Clause is fully
consistent with earlier decisions of this Court concerning
searches and sei z ures that
freedoms.

For e x ample,

p ~ tially

in~ anford

impinge on First Amendment

v. Texas, supra, this Court

relied upon the particularity requirement of the Warrant Clause
to invalidate a seizure of some 2,000 books belonging to
petitioner.

Mr. Justice Stewart's opinion for the Court clearly

demonstrated that the assurances included in the Warrant Clause
are s uff i ci e ntl y f l exibl e to t ake ac count of First Amendmen t
values.
[T]he constitutional requirement that warra nts
must particularly describe the "things to be seized"
is to be accorded the most scrupulous exactitude
when the "things" are books, and the basis for their
\ seizure is the ideas which they contain. * * *
He need not decide in the present case whether the
description of the things to be seized would have
been too generalized to pass constitutional muster,
had the things been weapons, narcotics or***
[other] contraband of that kind * * *·
379 U. S. at 485-486 .

l

In Heller v. New York, 413 U.S. 483 ,

this Court sustained the warranted seizure of an allegedly obscene
film, even though the

~varrant

had been issued in the usual ex parte

manner and no p r ior adversary hearing had b e en conducted on
the character of the film.

The Court again emphasized that the

n e cessity for a prior judicia l determination of probable cause
provides me aning f ul safe gu a rds even in the First Amendme nt area.
Id . at 49 2 -493.

J..!±/

Othe r d e cision s are no t to the cont r ary .

i
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Thi s c a se, like He ller, inv olves no pr i or rest raint on
expres s ion.
Neither cas e present s a situat i on in which pol ice
of fic er s have se i zed or attempted t o se i ze a part y ' s onl y copy of
a f i lm or photo graph, thu s preventin g furt h er exh i b i tion or
pub li cat i on.
To guar d a ga in st s u c h a n e v e n t u a li ty, the Cou rt
in Heller directe d th a t " pr ompt co pyin g of se i zed mate rial s houl d
be permitte d.
I f cop y in g is d e n ied, re turn of t h e seized material
should b e requir ed ." 413 U.S. a t 493 n . 11.
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As the Court noted in Heller, id. at 491, both a Quantity of
Books v. Kansas, supra, and Marcus v. Search Harrant, supra,
involved "the seizure of large quantities of books for the
sole purpose of their destruction

..,·~

..,.,

-,·~

"

The official action

in those cases plainly obstructed the circulation of material
arguably entitled to First Amendment protection, thereby
invoking the need for a prior adversary hearing.

By contrast,

in Heller and the present case, no limitation was imposed on
dissemination.

The district court decided this case on respondent's
motion for summary judgment.

We have argued that the declaratory

relief granted to respondents was awarded on the basis of an
erroneous legal theory.

Under the approach outlined in this brief,

the courts below might still find that the search of the Daily's
offices, though authorized by warrant, was unreasonable, either
because the warrant did not contain necessary restrictions on the
manner of its execution or because under the circumstances no
The primarily factual nature of such a determination
search should have been permitted at all.~- and the present controversy among the parties regarding the factual inferences to be
drawn from the record as it now stands -- suggest

that summary

judgment is an inappropriate procedure for resolution of the under 1 ying
:::::==:::=----~

be--;_;:;ersed

~the -case

..

~

dispute in this case.--

We therefore recommend that the judgment

rerronded to the court of appeals for whatever further

proceedings that court may deem fitting in light of this Court's
opinion.

The court of appeals should be invited to consider whether, in

I

-

view of the revised posture of the case, any constitutional barriers
prevent the award of declaratory relief.

See Ashcroft v. Mattis, 431 U.S. 171.

Likewise, the court of appeals should be asked to examine 'vhether, even in
t he absence of constitutional obstacles, a federal court should exercise its
statutory discretion to grant a declaratory judgp1ent announcing the unreasonable~

......,,_.._..___,;"'

....

ness of an individual search.

See 28 U.S.C. 2201.

15/ The precise details of the search itself, for exmnple, could be highly )
relevant to the result, irrespective of the inclusion vel non of salutary
conditions in the warrant.
-- --

\ (
•

-

.........

____
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II.
A.

ASSUMING RESPONDENTS WERE ENTITLED TO PREVAIL ON
THE MERITS, THE AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES WAS PROPER

The Civil Riehts Attorney's Fees Awards Act Authorized the
Award of Fees for Services Performed Before the Act Became
Law.
If this Court should affirm the decision below on the

merits, the award of attorney's fees should also be affirmed.
The district court awarded attorney's fees to the
respondents here because (Pet. App. 50):
fee shifting is necessary to insure the vindication
of important constitutional rights and appropriate
because of the inadequate remedies otherwise available,
because it is consistent with a remedy increasingly
furnished by Congress, and because of the high social
value placed upon the rights involve d, an award of
attorney's fees as costs is essential, lest these
important rights be relegated to a mere platitude.
[footnote omitted]
Although the court's award was consistent with the decisions of
many federal courts awarding attorney's fees to plaintiffs on
16/
similar "private attorney general" rationales,- this Court
subsequently found such awards improper in Alyeska Pipeline Co.
v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240.

In that case, this Court

held that exceptions to the general American rule that litigants
17 I
pay their own attorney's fees are for Congress to enact,
and,
while Congress had enacted several provisions in selected
statutes permitting a federal court to award fees to a successful
litigant, it had not "extended any roving authority to the
Judiciary to allow counsel fees as costs or otherwise whenever
the courts deem them warranted."

421 U.S. at 260.

16/
See, e.g.,
Sousa v. Travis ono, 512 F. 2d 1137 (C.A. 1), vacated,
47J U.S. Bog, Cornlst v. Richland Parish School Board, 495 F.2d
189 (C.A. 5); Tay lor v. Perini, 503 F.2d 899 (C.A. 6), vac ated
421 U.S. 982; ponohue v. Stauton, 471 F.2d 475 (C.A. 7),
'
certiorari deni ed , 410 U.S. 955; Fowler v. Schwarzwo lder, 498 F.2d
143 (C.A. 8), Brandenburger v. Thompson, 49 4 F. 2d 883~.A. 9).
lV ,,~h e court in ~ l yeska specifically approved (4 21 U.S . at 259)
th e . lnheren~ pow~r i;; the courts to allmv attorney ' s fees in
partlcular Sl tuatlons -- including when the l osin g party has
acted in bad faith.
J

..

.

..

II
~

\
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I
~·t

\'lhile this case was still pending in the cour-t
of appeals, Congress enacted the Civil Rights Attorney's
Fees Awards .i\ct of 1976, Pub. L. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641,
42 U.S.C.

* * *

(Supp. V) 1988.

That Act provides: "[i]n any action

to enforce a provision of Section

Revised Statutes

[42 U.S.C. 1983]

* * *

* * *

* * *

of the

the court, in its

discretion , may allow the prevailing party
attorney ' s fees as part of the costs."

1979

r easonable

* * *

It was specifically

designed to "remedy anomalous gaps in our civil rights laws
created by the United States Supreme Court's recent decision
in Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v . Wilderness Society'',
No.

s.

Rep.

94 - 1011, 94th Cong . 2d Sess . 1 (1976).
The court of appeals correctly held that the passage

of the Act "revalidated" the district court ' s award of attorney's
fees

(Pet .

App.

6).

This conclusion is amply

supported by the legislative history of the Act and by the
decisions of this Court.
In Bradley v. Richmond School Board, 416 U.S. 696,
t his Court affirmed an award of attorney ' s fees for services
performed before the statute authorizing the aw ard was enacted.
Although the legislative history of 20 U.S.C. 1617, the statute
involved in Bradley, was ambiguous concerning \vhether it \'las to be
applied to pending cases (416 U.S. at 716, and n. 22), the Court
applied the general rule followed when there is a c hange of law
while a case is pending on appeal: it app lied the law in effe ct at
the time of decis i on , in the abs ence of clear indication of a
contrary legislative in tent or a showing that man ifest injust ic e
would result from application of the new l aw.

416

u.s.

at 711;

Thorpe v. Housing Autho rity of t h e City of Durham, 393 U.S. 268;
United Sta tes v . The Schooner Peggy , 1 Cranch 103.

'

,,
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In con trast to the legislative history of the statute
involved in Bradley, the legislative hi story h ere is cl e ar.

In

passing the Civil Rights Attorney ' s Fees Awards Act, Congress
repeatedly indic ated its intent that the courts wer e to have
authority to awar d attorney's fees in pending cases, as well as
those instituted after enactment of t he Act.

The House specifically

rejected an amendment making the Act applicable only to cases
filed after the effective date of the Act (12 2 Cong. Rec . H. 12160
(d aily ed., 10-l-76}).

The committee reports both expressly

state that the bill permits awards in pending cases, referring
to Bradley as authority.

S. Rep. No. 94-1011; 94th Cong. 2d

I

Sess. 5 (1976); H. R. Rep. No. 94-1558, 94th Cong. 2d Sess. 4,
n. 6 (1976).

Moreover, during the floor debat e, members of

Congress consistently stated that the Act would apply to cases
pending at the time of enactment, and cited Bradley as support
for that point.
October l, 1976)

See, 122 Cong. Rec. H. 12160 (daily ed.,
( remarks of Rep. Drinan, floor leader of the

legislation in th e House); 122 Cong. Rec.
September 29, 197 6 )

s.

17052 (daily cd.

(remarks of Sen. Abourezk).

See also,

122 Cong. Rec. H. 12155 (daily ed., October l, 1976)
of Rep.

(remarks

18 /

Anderson)~

18/
The suggestion of petitioners in No. 76-1484 (Br. at 41-42)
that an award of attorney's fees in pending cases may not cover
services performed before the passage of the Act is flatly
inconsistent with Bradley, in which this Court focused on the
propriety of "the application of the statute to an award of fee s
for services render ed prior to its effec tive date " (416 U.S. at 721),
and specifically held that the district court was authorized to
allow reasonable atto rn ey's fees from a date preceding the enactment
of the statute (i d. at 724).
Nothing in the l eg islative history
of the 1976 Attor ney 's Fees Awa rds Act suggests that Congress
intended the limit ati on petitioners suggest.
Instead, both the
extensive r e lianc e on Bradley and the Congressional intent to undo
the effe cts of the Alyeska decision , supra at
, strongly indicate
that Congress intended to authorize tc:;e a\vard s for all services
performed in p ending cases.
The courts of appeals agree .
See
Iainey v. Jackson State College , 551 F . 2d 672 (C.A. 5);
~Gez Rodriq u ez v. Jimen,:c z·-,-551 F. 2d 87 (C. A. l); Bond v.
Stdnton, 555 F. 2-d 175- (C:J\..--7); Finney v. Hutto, 5•!8 F . id 740
(C.~·) , certiorari granted, No . -76-T660.

- 35 In light of this compelling legislative history, the
court of appeals did not consider whethGr interpreting the statute
to apply as Congress intended would result in manifest injustice.
Nor do we think that Bradley suggests that such an inquiry is

19/
required in thes e circumstances.In any event, her e , as in Bradley, an award of attorney's
fees for services performed before the Act b e came effective works
no injustice.

In concluding that the retroactive award in Bradley

worked no injustice, the court considered "(a) the nature and
identity of the parties,
(c)

(b)

the nature of their rights, and

the nature of the impact of the change in law upon those rights. "

416 U.S. at 717.

The Court's analysis in Bradley supports the award

I

I
I

of fees here.
(a)

!

l
In Bradley, the Court noted a disparity in the

ability of the publicly funded school board and the plaintiff
school children to protect their rights , and noted that the suit
rendered the Board a substantial service by bringing it into conformity
with the Constitution.

Similarly, here the respondent is a

university nGwspa per , while the petitioners, although named individually,
are defended by their

employe~,

the City of Palo Alto and th e

~---------~~----~---County
of Santa Clara, and these entities will be responsible for any
:w:r-t~

------- ---

~w:a

judgments against them (Calif. Gov't Cod e §825).

And, as in

Bradley, this action, if affirmed on the merits, will have accomplished

1.2/

The questi on considered in Bradley, and here resolved by
Congress , is whether th e fact of retroactivity itself makes the award
unjust.
Of cours e , the district court must always conside r whether
shifting the costs of litigation in the particular case is just, as it
did here (Pet. App. 43-53); petitioners are incorrect in suggesting
that the award of attor n ey ' s fees is the inevitable result of a civil
rights complaint (Bergna Br. 27 ).

20/
See also Calif. Gov 't Code §995 et seq., and Wi lliams v.
Ho1::vath, 16 Cal. 3d 834, 548 P. 2d 1125, inwhich the Califo~·nia
Sup:: emc Court ci lc.:s the district court opinion in ·this case as support
for a holding that Section 825 appljcs to cases brought against state
employees under 42 U.S .C. 1983. Petitioners' briefs do not dispute the
district court ' s asse rtion (P et. App. 52-53 ) that the public employers
\?ill pay any judgnent for attorney' s fees entered in this case.
See
Bc:!:'gt:a Br. 32, and Zurch0r Lr . 40 & r1. 23.
Although the Zurcher brief
sLates that holding the officers r ~svons ible for the award of fees
'.wuld "punish them", tha·t brief v.1as filed by the City Attorney for the
City of Palo Alto, employer of the defendant officers (s ee A. 16, 45 ),
indic2ting that the City is defending the officers pursuant to Section
825 and will also, under that sta tut e, be responsible for any award of
fees against thGs e petit ioners.

II
l

I
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a s ubstantial public servic e to th e law enfor ceme nt community by
br i ng ing its actions into comp l iance with con st i tut ional stand ards.
(b)

In Bradley, t h e enac tme n t of t h e s t atut e permitting

th e a ward of attorn e y's fe e s d id not affect a ny p r eviously un c ondit ion a l righ t o f the Sch o ol Board to d e t ermine th e use of the
fu n ds the court required to b e us e d t o pay at t orney 's fees.
sit u ation here is precisely simil a r.

The

In both cases, "[t]hese funds

\vere essentially held in trust for th e public, and at all times
the Board [or, here, the City and County] was subject to such
conditions or instructions on the use of the funds as the public
\·7ished t o make t hroug h i ts d uly e l octed r e p reser..ta.ti.ves ."
at 720.

416

u.s.

Cf. Greene v. United States, 376 U.S. 149.
(c)

Finally, th e change in the l aw r e lating to the

award of attorney's fees had no impact, eithe r her e or in Bradley,
on the substantive law on th e basis of which th e cas e was decide d -th e r e , the application of the Constitution to school desegregation,
a nd he re, t h e responsibiliti e s of law en f orce me n t personne l und e r
th e Fourth Amendme nt.

Mor e over, wh e n this case was filed and

lit igated in the d istrict c ourt and until th e Alye ska de cision,
an a'::ar d o f a ttor ney 's fe es was itself possibl e unde r the "private
a t t.:.orney g ene ral" theor y.
(N. D. Ca lif.) .

See La Raza Unida v. Volpe , 57 F.R.D. 94

Th us, a s in Bradl e y, th e r e is no indication th a t,

i f pet it i o ners h ad k nown of their pote n t i a l l iab ility u n d e r the
1 976 Act , th i s knowledg e "wo ul d h ave ca used [the m] to order [thei r ]
conduct so as to re n de r this liti gatio n unnecessary a n d t hereby preclude
th0 inc urring of such co sts."

416 U.S . a t

2V

7 21 .-

21 T__ _ The Califor n ia lo1.•r under '.vhich U1e puhlic employers
of :..:1e pcti ti.oncrs provide x cpn:: ~:;cnt :ttion and· indemnification
hac; 0-:?en in effect sjnce 1963.
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Petitioners argue

(Zurcher Br. 43-45) that rctro-

active application of the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Award Act
is manifestly unjust in cases challenging actions taken in good
faith in conformity with then-existing le0al standards.

But the

defendants' good faith--either in taking the action alleged to
violate the Constitution or in defending the suit--is not a proper
basis for precluding application of the Act, either prospectively
or retroactively.

As this Court recognized in Alyeska Pipeline

Service Co. v. The Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 258-259, it
has long been the rule that attorney's fees may be awarded against
a party who has acted in bad faith, and Alyeska did not alter that
rule. According l y , there would have been no purpose in enacting the
Attorney's Fees Awards Act if it were to apply only where the losing
party had acted in bad faith.

211

Moreover, whether the Act is applied

prospectively or retroactively, officials acting in good faith pursuant to valid laws and defending suits arising therefrom would
scarcely be influenced by the possibility that their actions may
eventually result in the award

of attorney's fees against the

public entities they represent. Awards of fees are appropriate under
the Act when litigation vindicates public policy inherent in constitutional principles.

It was therefore proper for the district

court, after finding that this action had done so to exercise
'
its discretionary authorit y to award attorney's fees.

2V A holding that attorney's fees should ordinarily not be awarded
unless the actions of the party to be charged were in clear violation
of constitutional or statutory principles would be inconsistent with
the statutory purpose--which is to encourage plaintiffs to seek to
vindicate constitutional principles, not merely to deter egregious
and obvious violations.
In Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express Inc.~
488 F . 2d 714, 718 (C.A. 5), the Fifth Circuit stated that
attorney's fees in cases prese nting novel issues should appropriately
compensate the at torney "for accepting the challenge". Congt"ess,
in passing the Attorne y 's Fees Act, cited Johnson as correctly
explaining standards governin0 awards of fees~ee S. Rep. No. 94lOlJ, su:,ra , at 6; H.R. Rep. No. 94-1558, ~~£?-'at 8.
122 Cong.
Rcc. H. 12160 (daily cd. Oct . l, 1976) remarks of Rep. Drinan).: 122
Cong. Rec . S 16491 (da-il y ed . Sept. 23, 1976) remarks of Sen. Tunney)~

I

I

I
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B.

The Award of Fees Here Violates No ImmunitY From Suit
of the Petitioners.
Petitione rs in No . 76- 1600 conte nd (B e r1n a Br. 26 - 35 )

t h at requirin g them to pa y resp onde nt s ' a tto r n e y' s f ees is
inconsistent with their immuni ty , a s judicial and prosecuting
o f ficials,

from suits for damag es .

Th e common law off i ci a l

immunity upon which petitioners rel y is subject to limita tion

-

by statute, Hood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 316; Imbler v.
.......

- -

Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 434 (Hhit e , J.,

concurring).

Thus,

the enactment of the Attorney's Fees Awards Act removed whate v er immunity to the award of attorney's fees petitioners
migh t have enj oye d i n t he a b sence of th e Act .
The Act specifically authorizes an award of attorney's
fees to "the prevailing party" in "any action" brought under
42 U.S.C. 1983 , as was this one.

Although Congress did not

provide for the naming of municipalities as defendants in
cases brought under 42 U.S.C. 1983 (Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S.
167), state and local officials clearly are subject to that
act as "persons" acting "under color of" state laws.

As

Congress note d in enacting the Attorney's Fees Awards Act
(S.

Rep . No . 9 4-1011, supra, at5) :
defenda nts in the s e cases are often State
or loca l bodies o r State or local offici a ls .
In such cases it is intended that the
attorne y s' fees , like other items of costs,
will b e collected e ither directly from
the official, in his o f ficial capacity , from
funds of his agen cy or unde r his control,
or from t he Sta te or local government
(wh eth er or not t he a g ency or governme n t
is a n ame d party ) [ f ootnote omittedl .

The House Re p o rt is to the s ame e ff e ct (H . R. Re p . No.
23 I
supra, at 7) .--

9 L~-1558,

2Y

Contrary to pe ti tioners ' suggestion (Bergna Br . 31 -32),
Tt is not necessary th at muni c ipalities be subjec t to suit in
order to impose on t h ose entities the obl i gation to pay
opposing attorney's fees.
Ther e is no requi rement th a t a g ove rnme n ta l ent i t y must
b e a name d defen da nt f or the co urt to i s sue a n orde r req uirin g

I
I

- 39 In light of this legislative history, it would be
inappropriate to construe the broad language of the Civil
Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act as incorporating an exception comparable to the common law immunity of certain officials
from suits for damages that this Court has held to be preserved
in 42 U.S.C. 1983 (see Tenny v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367; Imbler
v. Pachtman, supra).

That common law immunity, which protects

the covered official only from personal suits for damages (see Imbler
v. Pachtman, supra, 424 U.S. at 428-429), is entirely compatible
with a statutory award of attorney's fees when equitable relief
has been secured against such an official.
court costs,

Like an award of

the award is intended neither to compensate

victims nor to punish the official for past illegal acts.

7

Nor is the possibility of such an award, to be paid with pub24/
lie funds,- 1 ike ly to deter public officials in the conscientious 1
performance of their duties.

~ a~~

.... -v(,

1-r-

~d.c.~~ ·
Footnote

23 (Continued) :

the expenditure of the funds of that entity.
Indeed, in Fitz£atrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 449 n. 9, this Court approved
an award of backpay and attorney's fees to be paid from state
funds, although neither the state nor any state agency was a
named defendant.
Since the public entity confers upon its
officers the authority to act on its behalf, it is entirely
appropriate to require the entity to pay attorney's fees in
civil rights suits challenging those actions, regardless of
whether the entity has been named as a defendant.
In any event, although the district court noted, and petitioners evidently agree (see supra,at 35 n.20) that the governmental entities employing petltioners would pay any fees awarded
here, they are not subject to any court order to do so, and thus
this case does not raise the question of a federal court's jurisdiction to enter such an order.
That question is raised in Hutto
v. Finney, No. 76-1660, certiorari granted October 17, 1977, and
wilT be discuss ed in the government's brief amicus curiae in that
case.
2L~/

The committee reports referred to in the preceding paragraph
obviously contemp late that av1ards under the Act will be paid with
public funds.
In the unlikely event that a court were to award
attorney ' s fees Hithout specifying that they were to be paid
from public funds, and the employing governmental entity refused
to pay them , the court might well reconsider the award against
the official, or direct his employer to pay it. Although not
all states specifically provide by statute for the inde@1ification of public employees, they evidently all do provide for
legal assistance (Brief amicus curiae of Al A.barna, et al., App.
A).

.
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CONCLUSION
The judgment of the court of appeals should be
reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings.

If,

however, the judgment on the merits is affirmed, the award
of attorney's fees should also be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted.

HADE H. HcCREE, JR.,
Solicitor General.
ANDREW L. FREY,
Deputy Solicitor General.
HARRIET S. SHAPIRO,
PETER BUSCEHI,
Assistants to the Solicitor General.
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On the broadest view, these cases presents the
question whether, under the Fourth Amendment, a search
carried out in complete conformity with the probable cause
requirements of the warrant procedure can still be
considered unreasonable.

Somewhat more narrowly, the

cases require the Court to decide whether a "convergence"
of the First and Fourth Amendments demands the
establishment of special procedures for obtaining "mere
evidence" from newspaper offices and other media centers.

2.

If either of these questions is answered affirmatively,
then Court will be faced with the question whether the
recent amendment to 42

u.s.c.

§

1988, providing for awards

of attorneys' fees to victorious plaintiffs in civil
rights cases (1} is applicable to cases pending at the
time of its passage, and (2} requires an award of fees
even when the defendants are insulated from damage
liability by an absolute or good faith immunity under

§

1983.

I

FOURTH AMENDMENT "UNREASONABLENESS"
The District Court below appears to have created

-

-

a rule under the Fourth Amendment that applies broadly to
all "non-suspects," not just to the press.

He did this by

apply ~ alogy to the requirements of the Federal Rules of
~

.

Criminal Procedure with respect to arrests of material
witnesses and by applying a "least restrictive
alternative" analysis to the Fourth Amendment's
requirement of reasonableness.

Both techniques appear

somewhat questionable.

A.

Analogy to the Federal Rules

The District Court recognized that there was no
direct precedential guidance on the question of so-called
third-party searches.

Indeed, this sort of search of

3.

media offices appears to have originated only in the late
Sixties, with the establishment of close ties between the
underground press and the radical student and political
movements.

Since 1969, there have been only six

documented cases of similar searches for mere evidence.
-------------~-:-- -Judge Peckham, however, felt that his holding was
"compelled" by Bacon v. United States, 449 F.2d 933 (CA9

~
~

1971) , in which CA9 had ruled that a material witness may

..

not be arrested without a showing of probable cause that
it is

impracticab~e

to obtain the witness' presence at a

grand jury by subpoena.

Bacon was decided under Criminal
'-------------------~
Rule 46(b), rather than under the Fourth Amendment. Judge
Peckham recognized this, but argued that there was a
strong presumption that the Criminal Rules implemented the
Fourth Amendment.

This argument comes out of thin air;

the cases offered in support of it are merely examples of
the technique of reading statutes so as not to create
conflicts with the Constitution, e.g., Giordenello v.
United States, 357

u.s.

480, 485-486 (1958) (Fed. R. Crim.

P. require independent determination by neutral magistrate
of probable cause basis for granting arrest warrant).
Even if the result in Bacon were held to be
constitutionally compelled, it would not follow that its
conclusion with respect to arrests automatically
controlled a case involving a search.

Judge Peckham felt

that the right to be free of an unlawful search was

4.

entitled to greater protection than the right to be free
from an unlawful arrest, at least with respect to persons
not specifically suspected of a crime.
400 U.S. 309 (1971)

Wyman v. James,

(no probable cause required for visit

to home of welfare recipient), and Camara v. Municipal
Court, 387

u.s. 523 (1967) (housing code inspection

requires only probable cause to believe that violations
exist in the area of the city to be searched), however,
seem to undercut Judge Peckham's notion.
that a search

som~times

They suggest

may be carried out in the absence

of probable cause to believe that the particular subject
of the search committed any wrong.

No such laxity exists

in the arrest area, where a police officer still is
required to have probable cause to believe that the
individual arrested committed a felony.

L. Hall, Y.

Kamisar, W. LaFave, & J. Israel, Modern Criminal Procedure
270 (3d ed. 1969).
Even if the values to be protected in a search
and an arrest are considered to be of equal weight, in the
context of a third party (i.e., someone not actually
suspected of the crime himself), the presently available
protections surrounding a search may be greater than those
surrounding an arrest.

Both involved probable cause -- on

~-------~---~--------~---the
one hand to believe that the material to be searched
for will be relevant to the criminal investigation, on the
other hand, to believe that the material witness'
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testimony will, in fact, be

material~

-

A·search warrant,

though, embraces _an additional requirement:

there must be

probable cause to believe that the material is located
where alleged.

Thus, while the resort to a subpoena may

be necessary to prevent frequent mistaken arrests of
material witnesses, the "location" requirement of a search
warrant already provides some additional protection
against mistaken invasions of Fourth Amendment privacy.
The additional protection afforded by requiring a subpoena
does not look constitutionally necessary, at least by
comparison to the arrest situation.

B.

Fourth Amendment "Less Restrictive Alternatives"
Judge Peckham did not rest his analysis on the

analogy to the Criminal Rules regarding material
witnesses.

Without discussion of its propriety in a

Fourth Amendment context, he applied "less restrictive

--

alternative" analysis to the third party search

----------------~~

situation.

Because Respondents dwell at such length on the
First Amendment aspects of the case, they do not deal in
any detail with the sources of this Fourth Amendment
analysis.

It could be said, perhaps, that less

restrictive alternative analysis is a corollary to the
balancing tests used to decide the constitutionality of
stop and frisk procedures, e.g, Terry v. Ohio, 392

u.s.

1
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Pennsylvania v. Mimms, No. · 76-1830 (November --,

(1968):

1977), and noncriminal inspection schemes, e.g, Camara,
supra.

In those cases, however, the balancing involved

alternatives short Qf obtaining a warrant.

There really

was no suggestion that a warranted search could be
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
It could be argued that a reasonableness test
always presupposes considerations of less drastic
alternatives.

u.s.
•

479, 490

In his dissent in Shelton v. Tucker, 364
(1~60),

Justice Frankfurter noted, in a

First Amendment context, that "whenever the reasonableness
• •• of a measure [is] at issue • . . the availability or
unavailability of alternative methods of proceeding is
germane."

This does not answer the fundamental question,

however, which is whether the Constitution establishes the
warrant procedure as a "safe harbor" of reasonableness.

A

holding that warranted searches may be unreasonable under
the Fourth Amendment alone would, at the least, represent
the fashioning of novel constitutional doctrine.
The argument in favor of such a doctrine
ultimately is undone, I think, by Warden v. Hayden, 387
U.S. 294 (1967).

That case held that there was no

rational distinction between a search for "mere evidence"
and one for an "instrumentality" in terms of the privacy
which is safeguarded by the Fourth Amendment.

Yet this is

precisely the distinction that Respondents would make in

terms of third parties.

They

concede~

Br. at 11, that a

subpoena would not be required for the search of
third-party premises in order to seize instrumentalities
of the crime or contraband.

Any other conclusion might

fly in the face of many holdings of this court.
Steele v. United States, 267

u.s.

498 (1925).

E.g,
But if the

premises of the non-suspect are subject to search for that
type of material, it is not clear why there is any greater
invasion of Fourth Amendment privacy when the premises are

----'-

searched for "mere evidence."

-

' , 1 tAr.• .

The Warden v. Hayden Court

seemed to feel that the privacy interests at stake were
identical:
Nothing in the language of the Fourth Amendment
supports the distinction between "mere evidence"
and instrumentalities, fruits of crime, or
/ cqnt~. On its face, the provision assures
t~r1g~ of the people to be secure in their
perons, houses, papers, and effects . . . ,"
without regard to the use to which any of these
things are applied. This ."right of the people"
is certainly unrelated to the "mere evidence"
limitation. Privacy is disturbed no more by a
search directed to a purely evidentiary object
than it is by a search directed to an
instrumentality, fruit, or contraband. A
magistrate can intervene in both situations, and
the requirements of probable cause and
specificity can be preserved intact. Moreover,
nothing in the nature of property seized as
evidence renders it more private than property
seized, for example, as an instrumentality;
quite the opposite may be true. Indeed, the
distinction is wholly irrational, since,
depending on the circumstances, the same "papers
and effects" may be "mere evidence" in one case
and "instrumentality" in another.
387

u.s.

at 301-302.

Given that the non-suspect's privacy

8.

can be invaded via warranted searches for
instrumentalities, Warden v. Hayden makes it look as
though there is no reason to accord additional protection
to an attempt to obtain mere evidence.

The invasion of

privacy is no greater in constitutional terms.
Judge Peckham

at~pted

to distinguish Warden v.

Hayden on the ground that decided what may be seized,
1\

-

rather than who may be made the subject of a warrant.
Petn in No. 76-1600 at 20.
correct.

Strictly speaking, that is

But it is conceded that a non-suspect may be

made the subject of a search under circumstances, i.e.,
tz-,J2-..

when there contraband, fruit, or an instrumentality on his
A

premises.

The question then becomes whether other

circumstances, i.e., a search for mere evidence, differ
enough to entail different consequences under the Fourth
Amendment.

Under the view of Warden v. Hayden, there is

---------~'-------------------no difference between
merE? evidence and other material in

_____________,____

w--~~~------~,

_.~-------------------------

termS of Fourth Amendment protection.
envision one.

Nor is it easy to

It certainly would appear that the

non-suspect's privacy is invaded to just as great a degree
when a search is conducted for an instrumentality, as when
one is conducted for mere evidence.
Thus, the need for a less restrictive
alternative, premised on the Fourth Amendment alone, is
difficult to discern.
· Note that Judge Peckham did not draw this

9.

distinction between mere evidence and . contraband, etc.

A

cursory reading of -his opinion would suggest that no such
distinction was intended.

It would

seem~

though, that

some such distinction would have to reappear in the
"practicality" investigation -- the determination whether
resort to a subpoena is impractical.

See p. 12 below.

If

the distinction did not appear at that stage, the whole
process would likely be unacceptable to any court
concerned about effective law enforcement.

Hence,

Respondents merely moved their concession up one step.

c.

The Viability of the Less Restrictive Alternative
Assuming that the Court does find a need for a

less restrictive alternative in Fourth Amendment analysis,

-

the next question is whether the subpoena procedure is
truly less restrictive, and whether it is substantially as

·-

effective in law enforcment terms.

Judge Peckham

concluded that the subpoena's lesser intrusion was
"obvious."
A search is physically more intrusive, in that
"the police do not go rummaging through one's home,
office, or desk if armed only with a subpoena."
21.

Petn at

Nor is the timing of the request likely to be an

inconvenience, as it may be with a search.

Finally, a

search permits the discovery and viewing of materials that
the police might not be able to identify in a subpoena.

10.

Nevertheless, a subpoena may also have serious
consequences in terms of Fourth Amendment privacy.
Preindictment subpoenas may be quite broad, since neither
the grand jury nor the prosecutor will have identified the
particular persons, or perhaps even the crimes, for which

------------

indictment is sought.

Blair v. United States, 250

u.s.

273, 282 (1919) (inquiries of a grand inquest not to be
narrowly limited).

Reasonable particularity has been more

stringently construed in the search warrant context.
Oklahoma Press Publ. Co. v. Walling, 327
(1946).

Moreover~

u.s.

186, 208

there is no requirement of a probable

cause showing that matter subpoenaed have some relation to
the case under investigation.

In re Dymo Indus., Inc.,

300 F. Supp. 532 (ND Cal.), aff'd, 418 F.2d 500 (CA9
1969), cert. denied, 397

u.s.

937

(1970).

A warrant can

be issued only if there is probable cause to believe that
the evidence is relevant and that it will be found at the
location specified.

Finally, while it may be argued that

the grand jury will act as more of a check upon
prosecutorial whim than will a mere magistrate, recent
experience has shown that grand juries may be just as
vulnerable as the magistrate to prosecutorial
manipulation.

E.g., Note, Federal Grand Jury

Investigation of Political Dissidents, 7 Harv. Civ. Rights
- Civ. Lib. L. Rev., 432, 445-446

(1972).

Hence, on pure

11.

between the search and the subpoena.
Judge Peckham's major reason for preferring the
subpoena, however, was the opportunity it provides the

~L~~ non-suspect

to litigate the propriety of the request, as

C17'r~ ~ opposed to the war~ant's ex parte execution.

Because the

~~

exclusionary rule is typically unavailable to third

~~

parties, reasoned Judge Peckham, there is no deterrent to
unlawful searches of non-suspects.

~ ~

The ability to contest

and quash a subpoena remedies this defect.
appealing rule;

This is an

there is something quite attractive about

the idea that innocent third parties should be able to
present their claims to a judge before the fact, since
they cannot be "made whole" through suppression of the
evidence, as a suspect can.

Yet once again, there is a

strange asymmetry about the rule.

Presumably,

non-suspects will not be afforded this right with respect
-...

.......

to instrumentalities, fruits, or contraband.

-

As noted

before, however, the invasion of their privacy seems no
greater in one situation than in the other.

It is not

clear why the Court should re-establish the "mere
evidence" doctrine, when the values to be protected are
the same ones we would be willing to sacrifice if the
material to be seized differed in the use to which it had
been applied.
Assuming that question is passed, the Court must
next consider whether the subpoena procedure would be

12.

nearly as effective in accomplishing the government goal
as the challenged search warrant practice.

Clearly there

will be situations in which the police officers will be
unable to avow in the affidavit that the third party will
lose or destr0y

t~e

evidence, but in which such

destruction or loss nevertheless will result from the
advance warning and delay afforded by the subpoena
procedure.

The exact extent of these losses would depend

on the strength of the showing that, in Judge Peckham's
view, must be made to support the claim of likely
destruction, thereby obviating recourse to a subpoena and
permitting reliance on a warrant instead.

{It is here

that the "mere evidence"-contraband, etc., dichotomy would
have to reappear.

If the material sought is contraband or

an instrumentality, it is far more likely that the suspect
will seek to retrieve the items, that the third party may
dispose of them, and that there is some bond of sympathy
between the suspect and the third party.

Hence, resort to

a subpoena likely will result in destruction or loss of
the evidence.

If, as common sense would seem to dictate,

these are relevant considerations in the practicality
inquiry, then for all practical purposes the distinction
set up by Respondents' concession as to the
non-applicability of the subpoena procedure except with
respect to "mere evidence," see pp. 6-9 above, is
re-es~ablished.

If we are willing to countenance third

13.

party searches in those situations, it is unclear why we
should be more disturbed about searches for "mere
evidence.")

If the required showing of the danger of loss

or destruction is not too high, the inefficiency of the
subpoena procedure will trace only to the delays
occasioned by resistance to the the subpoenas.

It is, of

course, difficult to predict the exact extent of that
decrease in efficiency.

II
A SPECIAL RULE FOR THE PRESS
Assuming that the Court holds t at the Fourth
Amendment alone does not create a special zone of privacy

-

for third parties, the next question is whether
Respondents can claim special treatment through a

______....._,

convergence of the First and Fourth Amendment and their
status as members of the press.
extremely close.
Hayes, 408

u.s.

This question is

The plurality opinion in Branzburg v.
665 {1972), seems to undercut any special

claims of the press for special treatment in this area.

y\

Your plurality opinion in that case, however, seems to
offer Respondents more support.
Respondents identify four evils alleged to derive
from the search of a press facility:
of newsgathering and dissemination;

{1) the disruption
{2) the chilling of

sources through breaches of confidence stemming from

14.

discoveries made in the course of the search;

(3)

impairment of press independence, as the press is turned
into an "investigative arm" of the police;

and (4)

pressure for self-censorship, as newspaper conducts itself
timidly, so as to reduce the likelihood that a search will
be conducted.

~1

o f_l£ese evils

were_p rese~t,

to a

greater or lesser extent, in the Branzburg case.

Yet the

Court there held that members of the press were not free
from the obligation of every citizen to give his
evidence.
The interests evaluated in Branzburg bear
considerable resemblance to those involved here.

This

similarity casts doubt on a claim of special treatment for
newsgatherers.

First, the Branzburg Court minimized the

newsmen's claims that forcing them to divulge confidential
information would cripple their newsgathering functions;

-

there is no more evidence of such crippling here.
---~

~

Second,

the compelling governmental interest in Branzburg was the
need to permit grand jury investigation of criminal
activity.

~

Similar investigative needs are pr e sent here.

Nor can Branzburg be distinguished on the ground that it
involved grand jury investigation, while this case

~~
involves police
~~identical: the

~

searches.

The object in both cases is

securing "of the safety of the person and

property of the individual,"

408

~~- detection and prevention of crime.

u.s.

at 690, by the

Moreover, the grand

15.

jury's supposedly protective role is usually a dead letter
in practice, since the prosecutor can bend the jury to his
will.
The Respondents cite Roaden v. Kentucky, 413

u.s.

496 (1973), and other cases involving the pre-hearing
seizure of allegedly obscene materials.

These cases are

alleged to stand for the proposition that where the First
and Fourth Amendments converge, less restrictive
alternatives are to be sought.

Those cases, however,

involve prevention of prior restraint by precluding the
-------------------------~----seizure of all copies of an allegedly obscene book or
film.

There is no question of prior restraint in this

case.
Respondents also cite your opinion in United

p/.

~
v·/1-

States v. United States District Court, 407

u.s.

297

(1972), for the proposition that search and seizure
standards are stricter in the press context.

That opinion

explains that both First and Fourth Amendment interests

J · were

implicated in the Government's claim to be able to

~ ~

sidestep the warrant requirement on grounds of "domestic

J).)
~
·

security."

~ ,pJ

Id. at 313-314.

Those interests were

o{.pl'i cated, however, by the fact that the Government could

4 ybuse "domestic security" claims both to evade Fourth

'\)/

l .. F. f.

Amendment ._warrant requirements, thereby facilitating
government harassment of various groups for First

---------~~~. --------~

---

Amendment activity.

~

Here, the police are observing the
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warrant requirements, so that United States District Court
does not take Respondents very far.

--

Respondents place great weight on your
concurrence in Branzburg.

They emphasize the following

language from that opinion:
If a newsman believes that the grand jury
investigation is not being conducted in good
faith, he is not without remedy. Indeed, if the
newsman is called upon to give information
bearing only a remote and tenuous relationship to
the subject of the investigation, or if he has
some other reason to believe that his testimony
implicates confidential source relationships
without a legitimate need of law enforcement, he
will have access to the Court on a motion to
quash and an appropriate protective order may be
entered. The asserted claim to privilege should
be judged on its facts by the striking of a
proper balance between freedom of the P.·~ ess and
the obligation of all citizens to give relevant
testimony with respect to criminal conduct. The
balance of these vital constitutional and
societal interests on a case-by-case basis
accords with the tried and traditional way of
adjudicating such questions.
Id. at 709-710.

This right of case-by-case balancing,

claim Respondents, would be completely undercut by

--- ---- -

third-party searches of press facilities.

In order to

-------~
obtain
the balancing necessary to protect the freedom of

the press, there has to be some pre-search hearing.

The

subpoena procedure provides an opportunity for such a
hearing.
The difference between the Branzburg plurality

--

and your concurrence seems to be your willingness to
recognize case-by-case balancing because of the

-------------

~~(.? ·

.
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involvement of First Amendment considerations.

The

plurality opinion appeared to eschew balancing, in favor
of the traditional First Amendment "compelling state
interest" test.

408

u.s.

at 680-681, 700-701.

The

conclusion was that "the public interest in law
enforcement" is sufficient "to override" the negative
effects on the press.

Id. at 690-691.

This approach does

not seem to allow for varying levels of First Amendment
interest in different cases.

If not, then the interest

found compelling .in one case will be compelling in all
future cases.

That being the case, there is no reason to

provide the pre-search hearing available in the subpoena
process, since the test will not recognize claims that the
First Amendment interests in one case are stronger than
those in the previous one where a search was upheld.
Thus, the conclusion of the

Branzbu~g

plurality seems to

have been that newsmen are no different from ordinary
citizens with respect to their duties to testify before a
grand _jury.
Your concurrence, in contrast, . seems to permit
the press to make claims of varying levels of Fi rst

------------~~_.~-------~------~-------Amendment
and law enforcement interest from case to case .
...

-

-

If so, there would be no way to make these claims in the
warrant context.

Only the subpoena procedure offers the

press the opportunity to demonstrate that particular
requests should be denied on grounds of strong First

/,

Ff
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Amendment claims.
The difficulty is that this notion of permitting
the prospective subject of the search to raise
countervailing protected interests is extremely difficult
to confine to the press.

For example, the search of a

business office for ledgers showing that an acquaintance
of the businessman has been making suspiciously large cash
purchases lately might uncover marital exchanges between
the businessman and his spouse, exchanges that could be
held to fall with.in the scope of some notion of marital
privacy under Griswold v. Connecticut.

Moreover, the

Branzburg decision, both plurality and concurrence, seem
to stand for the proposition that the press is not to be
singled out for solicitous treatment with regard to
criminal investigation.

Therefore, if the press can bring

forth free press reasons

mi~ itating

against a subpoena,

private persons ought to be able to bring forth other
sorts of countervailing protected interests, e.g.,
attorney-client or marital privilege, First Amendment
right to receive questionable literature anonymously,
Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965), and the
like.

Finally, the four evils Respondents see in searches

of press facilities may' also result, though perhaps in
less dramatic form, from searches of other third parties.
Disruption of and interference with normal activity are
certai~

to result.

Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297

19.

u.s.

233 {1936), suggests that so long as all citizens are

subject to the same burdens -- in that case a
nondiscriminatory tax -- incidental effect on the press
will not violate the First Amendment.

Thus, interference

and disruption cannot be seen as purely press-related
evils.

All citizens are equally subject to them as the

result of third-party searches.

If they are offensive,

they must be offensive generally.
The chilling of sources, of course, will not be
duplicated precisely in a non-press search.

There may,

however, be a reluctance of others to communicate with
someone who is perceived as a likely object of such a
search.

If the First Amendment is held to protect the

right to receive information without revealing its receipt
to the government, see Lamont, supra, then non-press
parties ought to be able to count this as an "evil," too.
Impairment of independence is, perhaps, a greater
danger with the press than with private parties, since the
press does more investigative work and is a likelier
target for conversion into an information-gathering unit.

--

-

But certain types of private persons also could serve as

------.....__.._

information-gathering units, if subject to search without
notice:

banks, attorneys, accountants, physicians.

Of

course, such private parties may not be able to claim the
constitutionally recognized right of the press to
independence.

There is something appealing in the notion

20.

that private persons should not be dragooned into being
information services for the police without at least
having an opportunity to present interests in opposition
to the claimed law enforcement need.
Finally, there is some reason to believe that
members of the public generally will be more prone to
self-censorship, less likely to commit to paper private
thoughts that later could be transmitted to others.
The crucial questions thus boil down to three.
First, are you willing to extend the case-by-case
balancing approach of your Branzburg concurrence from the
context of grand jury testimony to the search warrant
context, because of possible First Amendment interests at
stake?

Second, if so, can that willingness be generalized

to embrace even non-press third parties who have similar
interests at stake in searches for mere evidence?

This

extension would have to rest on some notion that the First
Amendment creates some zone for privacy of thought and
communication outside of the public exchange of ideas via
the press.

Lamont, Stanley v. Georgia, 405 U.S. 645

(1969), and several other cases could be woven into such a
theory of First Amendment privacy.
Third, and most important, is the question
whether the game is worth the constitutional "candle" that
would have to be created to support it.

Everyone seems

willing to concede that warrants can issue when
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contraband, fruits, or instrumentalities are involved, or
when there is a suspicion that evidence will be lost or
destroyed (which may include cases in which contraband,
etc. are involved) •

That being so, the Court would be

creating quite a lot of First Amendment baggage in order
to protect persons in what might turn out to be a very
narrow class of cases.

The first principle would be that

the First Amendment protects persons from searches except
when there is a compelling state interest involved, and
unless there is a risk that evidence will be lost or
destroyed, there is no compelling reason to proceed by
means of search rather than subpoena.

The second

principle would be that even with respect to subpoena
requests, various countervailing interests may be brought
forward with varying chances of successs on a case-by-case
basis.

The opposing principle would . be one that seems to

flow from the Branzburg plurality:

the governmental need

for the evidence is a compelling state interest;

no more

need be shown to support the reasonableness of a warranted
search.
You could avoid the sweep attributed to your
Branzburg concurrence by Respondents.
Court's opinion in that case.
'-='--==a,...,

~ twn=? .._.

You did join in the

Hence, you could must

agreed with the view that, across the board, the need of
the grand jury for infor~ation was a compelling state
interest that overrode any claim by a reporter that mere

r

cf~

lf1v
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appearance or mere asking of questions compromised the
First Amendment.

Having recognized this across-the-board

subjection of the press to the requirements of the grand
jury, you were then more willing than the other members of
the Court to recognize, within the grand jury context, the
right of a witness -- in this case a reporter -- to
advance reasons in that case, First Amendment reasons
for refusing to answer an particular question.

Thus, you

could view your position as one of subjecting the press,
in a global

sens~,

to the same duties as other citizens.

You were simply more willing expressly to recognize the

-

-

--

-

competing kinds of considerations that individual members

-

.............._

of the press might advance once they were embarked upon
performance of that duty.

So here, you could, consistent

with your vote in Branzburg, hold that the press is
subject to the same forms of search as all other
citizens.

There simply is no second line of defense in

search context, as there is in the ability to quash or
refuse to answer a particular question before a grand
jury.

In all candor, though, your emphasis in Branzburg

on case-by-case balancing of the First Amendment interests
does make adherence to the notion that the whole process
can be sidestepped via a warranted search look a bit
difficult.
Petitioners argue that the court below improperly
failed · to take account of California's rule providing that
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criminal defendants may move to suppress evidence obtained
via searches of premises owned by third parties.

This

oversight, they say, undercuts the District Court's belief
that the subpoena procedure was necessary to protect the
rights of third parties, who -- it assumed -- lack other
means of deterring unlawful searches.

In purely Fourth

Amendment terms this point might be persuasive.

It is not

totally so in a First Amendment analysis, since there is
more reason for adopting the least restrictive alternative
in the First Amenoment context.
III
AWARD OF ATTORNEYS' FEES

Petitioners make two main arguments on this
score.

First, they argue that the attorneys' fees

amendment to

§

then pending.

1988 was not intended to apply to cases
Second, they argue that persons who can

claim immunity from damages liability ought not to be
subjected to "backdoor damages" via the imposition of
attorneys' fees.

A.

Applicability to Pending Cases

This issue seems fairly easy.

Petitioners argue

that the Act does not state on its face whether it is to
be applied retroactively.

Respondent, however, points to

a House · Report stating quite clearly that the Act was to

/

..
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apply to pending cases:

"In accordance with applicable

decisions of the Supreme Court, the bill is intended to
all cases pending on the date of enactment as well as all
future cases."
at 4 n.6

(1976).

H.R. Rep. No. 1558, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.,
Indeed, the Senate Report cited this

very case as an example of one to which the Act would
apply.

S. Rep. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., at 4 n. 3,

6 (1976).

Further, the congressional debates indicate

that retroactive application was contemplated.
for Resps at 56.
conclusion.

See Br.

The Fifth Circuit reached a similar

Rainey v. Jackson State College, 551 F.2d 672

(CAS 1977) •
Petitioners argue that the purpose of the Act,
encouraging the bringing of civil rights actions, will not
be furthered by applying it here, since the suit was
brought long before the Act was passed and without
reference to it.

This is not quite fair, since the suit

originally was brought before Alyeska Pipeline ended the
availability of attorneys' fees in such actions in the
Ninth Circuit, which previously had allowed them.
Brandenburger v. Thompson, 494 F.2d 885 (CA9 1974).

Thus,

Respondents well may have been encouraged by the prospect
of attorneys' fees all along.

Thus, no expectations of

Petitioners were frustrated by passage of the Act.

It

merely restored the situation they faced at the outset of
the suit.

Moreover, the specter of imposition of fees
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upon the individuals appears to be false.

Both courts

below found that the public entities would bear the costs.

B.

Preclusion of Fee Awards by § 1983 Immunity
The Ninth Circuit rejected the argument that

Petitioners' immunity from damages awards precluded
liability in a suit such as this, seeking only declaratory
and injunctive relief.

Petitioners apparently have repeat

that argument, although their briefs are not perfectly
clear on that point.

In any event, it is clear that they

argue that their § 1983 immunity extends to awards of
attorneys' fees.
Petitioners.

The Fifth Circuit has agreed with

In Universal Amusement Co. v. Vance, 559

F.2d 1286 (CAS 1977), CAS held that the Attorneys' Fees
Award Act does not change the judicially established rules
governing individual immunity for unconstitutional acts
committed by a person acting in his official capacity.
Id. at 1301.

"Thus, 'if the district court decides to

award fees against persons in their individual capacities,
it must respect the absolute immunity from money damages
enjoyed by prosectors, . . • as well as the qualified,
good faith immunity possessed by other government
officials • • • •

Consequently, any award of fees against

individual! implicated in this case may require a hearing
by the district court to develop facts [regarding bad
faith] not contained in the record, such as the scope and

26.

nature of the prosecutor's actions."

Id.

Respondents argue against this position,
insisting that it makes the passage of the Act
superfluous.

They appear to be correct.

Alyeska Pipeline

did not jeopardize the "bad faith" route to an award of
attorneys' fees.

If all that the Act means is that

plaintiffs can collect fees when they establish bad faith,
then it was indeed a superfluity.

Clearly, Congress

thought it was legislatively overruling Alyeska Pipeline.
Consequently, it . must have been approving fee awards on
the "private attorney general" theory, which does not
depend on a showing of bad faith.

The Senate Report

indicates that "attorneys' fees, like other items of
costs, will be collected either directly from the
official, in his official capacity, from funds of his
agency or under his control, or from the State or local
government (whether or not the agency or government is a
named party)."

s.

Rep., supra, at 5.

The House Report is

even more explicit:
[W]hile damages are theoretically avajlable [in
Civil Rights Act cases], it should be observed
that, in some cases, immunity doctrines and
special defenses, available only to public
officials, preclude or severly limit the damage
remedy.
[Citing cases.] Consequently, awarding
counsel fees to prevailing plaintiffs in such
litigation is particularly important and
necessa~ if Federal civil and constitutional
rights are to be adequately protected. To be
sure, in a large number of cases brought under
the provisions covered by [the Act], only
injunctive relief is sought, and prevailing
plaintiffs should ordinarily recover their
counsel fees.

27.
H.R. Rep., supra, at 9.
Petitioners' fallback argument is that the award
in this case works a "manifest injustice."

But that is

merely another way of saying that their good faith
immunity should protect them.

There is no greater

injustice here than in any other private attorney general
recovery.

Congress made the judgment that fees are to be

awarded in such cases.

That judgment may not make sense,

but it does appear to be the legislative will.
Petitioners, pushed to the wall, then argue that
it was beyond Congress' power under

§

5 of the Fourteenth

Amendment to "abrogate" the absolute immunity of judges
and prosecutors.

This argument is quite surprising, since

the judicial development of the various

§

1983 immunity

doctrines is merely a gloss on what was presumed to be the
legislative intent.

No case has held that those immunity

doctrines are constitutionally compelled, or that Congress
was without power to legislate a broader exposure.

This memo is already quite long, yet I'm not at
all confident that I have covered adequately all the quite
complicated questions involved.

If you want further work

done on any of the points, please let me know.

RDC I 1/16/78

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. JUSTICE POWELL
FROM:

Bob

RE:

SG's Brief in Stanford Daily Cases, Nos. 76-1484, -1600

Attached are both my bench memo for these cases and the
SG's brief amicus curiae, which just came in this morning.

It

is quite persuasive in reaching the same conclusion that the
bench memo reaches under the Fourth Amendment:

there is no

basis for finding a subpoena procedure required in Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence.
It is a bit less persuasive in the First Amendment area,
just as the bench memo vacillates more on that question.

The SG,

it seems to me, places a lot of First Amendment trust in the
sensitivity of the magistrate making the warrant decisions.
See SG Br. at 24-26.

I am not sure that one may dismiss First

Amendment concerns on so optimistic an assessment of the
thoughtfulness of magistrates.

Nevertheless, the SG makes

another point stressed also in the bench memo:

a "subpoena

first" rule carved out for the press under the First Amendment
respresents a judicial mdorsement of two classes of First Amendment
freedoms, one designed for private citizens, and one for the press.
This is entirely contrary to the thrust of Branzburg;

moeeover,

it would undoubeedly create pressure to expand similar protection
to the populace genera]f.

Such an expansion, pxvided that it

created a class of third parties broad enough to make the creation
of the rule sensible on its own terms, would effectively amend
the Fourth Amendment.
On the attorneys' fees question, I think the SG's brief
is correct, as indicated in the bench memo.
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MEMORANDUM FOR MR. JUSTICE POWELL
FROM:

Bob

DATE:

Jan. 19, 1978

RE:

Iirst Amendment Issue in Stanford Daily Cases, Nos. 76-1484,
-1600
The motion for the return of property, Fed. R. Crim. P.

4l(e), which is cited by the SG as a post-compliance remedy
for an illegal search of a press office, would probably be
of limited usefulness for several reasons.

First, and most

important, it would not directly address the central _concern
of the press in seeking the creation of a subpoena-first rule.
The reason for seeking a subpoena procedure is that it would
allow the press individual involved to file a motion to quash
and then make the sorts of arguments noted in your Branzburg
concurrence:

that the evidence sought will bear only a tenuous

relationship to the investigation at hand, or that it will
severely damage a confidential source without a corresponding
benefit to the investigation.

Once a warrant procedure is

2.

invoked, however, these sorts of balancing claims probably
could not be made.

And even if they could be made in a logical

presentation, they probably would not succeed.
That is to say, the warrant procedure lets the police
look first and answer questions later.

If they come away from

the search with evidence that they think is important, a motion
arguing that the evidence is not important does not stand much
chance of success.

Moreover, the confidential source, presumably,

has already been revealed, so that there would fue little left
to "balance" against the usefulness of the evidence.
Even if such a challenge could be presented in a way that
did not make it appear ludicrous from the outset, it is not
clear that a "balancing" claim should succeed under Rule 4l(e),
as opposed to the grand jury context.

The question under Rule

4l(e) is whether the search was illegal.*

If the officers sub-

mitting the affidavits had probable cause to believe that the
evidence was in a particular place and that it related in a
vital way to the investigation, the warranted search will have
been "legal," despite the fact that the eventual evidentiary
payoff turns out to be lower than expected in relation to the
First AmQndment burden.

Moreover·, if it turns out that the

.____ --------------------------------------*Rule 4l(e) provides as follows :
(e) .i\ioti J 1 to !· rnr.., or Pro1~ 'J
A p:.:r~on ngg, ie·;..,c:l L. an
uT''• "" ful seurch and ~eizurc may move tl• district co'.! t for the di->·
trict in which th•: property was seized for the return of the property on
t he ground that he is entitled to lawful possession of the proprrty whil'r
was illegally seized. The judge shall receive evidence on any issue o:
fact necessary to the decision of the motion. If the motion is granted
the property shall be restored and it shall not be admissible in evidence
at any he. ring or trial. If a motion for return of property is madt:
or comes on for hearing in the district of trial after an indictment o;
information is filed, it shall be treated also as a motion to suppress under Rule 12.

3.

evidence does not pan out as the police reasonably expected,
they may be inclined to return it anyway, making the whole
motion procedure irrelevant.
Thus, the Rule 4l(e) procedure simply does not put the
press in the same procedural posture to make its First Amendment
claims.
The second failing of Rule 4l(e) vis-a-vis a subpoenafirst rule is that the subpoena procedure entirely prevents the
incidental burdens on the press, while the warrant procedure
will permit them.

The disruption of the newsroom, the rummaging

through unrelated and perhaps confidential material, the pressure
toward self-censorship, and the frightening of confidential
sources can be prevented only by a procedure that permits the
press to litigate first.
Finally, Rule 4l(e) is a federal rule, specifically
providing that evidence obtained illegally (from third parties,
presumably) cannot be used in evidence.

It is not clear

that the states necessarily would create similar rules, though
perhaps such a rule must follow from the extension of the
exclusionary rule to the states.

~also

may not be clear

that the third party's standing to recover his property-- even
assuming he thereby can prevent its use as evidence -- automatically
confers standing on the third party or the defendant to object
to the use of fruits of that illegally obtained evidence.
In terms of the protections that the press is seeking, then,

4.
Rule 4l(e) does not seem to go very far.

There may be more bite in forcing the press protections
to come in before the search, in the magistrate's warrant determination, as you indicate.

Since the magistrate is already

supposed to consider the factors listed by the SG as furnishing
some protection to the press, any opinion relying on this argument
would, I think, have to stress that in the case of the press
additional weight should be lent to such factors.

In particular,

I would emphasize the magistrate's power to impose special
restrictions

on the manner of execution in order to guarantee

the reasonableness of the search.

Thus, a command that the

executing officers refrain from searching particular areas
until an informal request for production has been made and
refused well may prevent many of the incidental burdens (disruption, rummaging, and discovery of unrelated confidences, though
not necessarily ~£-censorship or the frightening of confidential
sources) of which the press complains.
Here is a

ffC\iw.i"\Ary
propose <)~ hecklist

for magistrates confronted

with a request for a warrant to search what appears to be a
"press" installation:
1. What is the scope of the proposed search in
relation to the size of the target entity? That is,
if this is to be a search of a large metropolitan
newspaper, is the location of the evidence pinpointed
or will there have to be an office-by-office search
of the city room, the international room, the finanical
section, etc.? Such wholesale disruption, and consequent discovery of unrelated confidences might make
a particular search unreasonable. If the paper is
a smaller institution, the scope of the search may
have to be broader in relation to the size of the
place.

5.
2. Is this a bona fide member of the'li'ourth Estate,"
or is it a cra~eaiietter who also happens to
manufacture bombs in support ofthe positions in
his leaflets? In other words, could the target
of the search make a credible claim to be a member
of the "press" protected with especial particularity
by the First Amendment, or is he exercising the
general freedom of speech inhering in all citizens?
(This one runs some risk of freezing the "two-class
theory of the First Amendment" into law, but acknowledging any speeial concerns about searches of
the press seems to do that anyway, at least to a
limited extent.
3. Will the evidence sought be immediately recognizable,
so the executing officers will not have to sift through
mountains of material and make minute comparisons
among all the documents contained in the offices
to be searched?
4. Is this evidence so crucial to the initiation
of an investigation (as in this case), or is speed
so important to the preservation of the investigation's
likely success (perhaps because suspects will be
able to flee if they are not apprehended swfitly),
that the immediacy of a warrant search must be
preferred to the slower processes of a subpoena?
5. Is there any reason to believe that requiring
an initial, informal request for production of
the evidence by the executing officers will result
in the frustration of the search's purpose?
6. Are there alternative enforcment techniques
for discovering the same evidence?
7. Is the search, though otherwise reasonable,
opposed to some fundamental state or government
interest, such as a shield law; in other words,
is the warrant unreasonable in the light of all
the circumstances because it is used to circumvent countervailing policies? (This one may not
hold up, since it could be viewed as using the
Fourth Amendment to enforee state laws. On the
other hand, it could be viewed as taking in all
circumstances of reasonableness.)
8. It might be permissible to considert the
nature of the crime with which the evidence is
connected. For example, the more serious the crime,
the more intrusive the search could be. It might

6.

be inherently unreasonable to search the New York
Times for a photograph of an unknown jaywarKer:--

Obviously, these considerations are not exc l usive.
They are the sorts of things that magistrates cauls consider
within the framework , --or at least not too far outside of it
of current particularity and reasonableness requirements.
It would embody the First Amendment concerns within the Fourth
Amendment procedures created by the Framers.

It doesn't give

the press everything it wants, but everything seems to be too
mush in terms of constitutional doctrine.

Specifically, a

pre-search right to contest will always entail the dangers
involved in the
phrased.
are so

subpoena~first

rule, no matter how it is

(Only if the exceptions to the pre-search requirement

b~ d

disappear.)

as to render it meaningless will those dangers
Post-seizure adjudications, as with Rule 4l(e),

will not be able to meet the press' concerns.

Relying on

current warrant practices and pointing out the special considerations that may obtain in the case of the press could present
the best opportunity of blending pre-search protection with the
legitimate needs of law enforcement.

January 19, 1978

76-1484 and 76-1600 Stanford Daily Cases

~J
~
~~;~~~

I dictate this memo to summarize - in general terms
- my tentative views.
The District Court's opinion, adopted by CA9,
creates a new and novel concept of the Fourth Amendment
warrant clause.

Creating what has been called the "subpoena

first per se rule", the DC reads new requirements into the
Fourth Amendment with respect to all "non-suspects", not
just the press.

Absent a showing that a subpoena duces

tecum is impractical, a warrant to conduct a third party
search may not be issued by a magistrate regardless of how
strong the showing of probable cause may be.
Counsel for respondent virtually concedes that
there is no justification (in the history, language or
judicial interpretation of the Fourth Amendment) for the
"subpoena first rule" as applied to all third party
searches.

Such counsel contends, however, that the rule is

correct and should be affirmed with respect to the issuance
of warrants against any segment of the media.

Moreover, the

point is made that this is the only issue squarely before us.
I suppose it is correct to say that we only need
decide what I will call the "press issue", but in doing so

2.

we must discuss the applicable principles and decide whether
the Fourth Amendment means something different with respect
to third party searches than it does for other searches.

If

we decide, as I assume we will, that the Fourth Amendment
does not require the application of the subpoena first rule
to all third party searches, the question remains whether an
exception should be carved out because of the First
Amendment rights of the press.
As important as these rights are, I agree with the
SG that:
"Adoption of the 'subpoena first' rule modified to
apply only to searches of media offices, would
represent a judicial endorsement of two classes of
First Amendment freedoms, one designed for the
majority of American society and one tailored
specially for the press. Such a result would run
counter to recent decisions of this Court rejecting
• . . a newsman's right to preferential
treatment." (citing Branzburg, Pell and Saxby).
Apart from the absence of any justification for
"two classes of First Amendment freedoms" it would be
difficult to define the boundaries of the classes.

Even if

expressed in terms of the "media", the exception would
encompass - at least arguably - everything from an
underground "newspaper" controlled by the Mafia to the New
York Times.
Counsel for respondent would recognize an exception
to the "press exception" where the purpose of the warrant is
to reach "contraband, unlawful weapons, or the fruits of

3.

illegal activity".

(Br. 11).

This is the discredited

distinction between "mere evidence" and the
instrumentalities of crime or contraband - a distinction
deemed "wholly irrational" in Warden v. Hayden, 387
301-302.

u.s.,

at

The effects on First Amendment interests may be

the same with respect to searches either for contraband or
for "mere evidence."

At oral argument, counsel for

respondent agreed that the subpoena first rule should not
apply if there were probable cause to believe the photograph
in possession of a newspaper showed the actual commission of
a crime

(~.g.,

the picture of Ruby shooting Oswald).

But

inconsistently, the same counsel thought that pictures of
persons clubbing policemen (including those lying on the
ground) should be protected by the subpoena first rule.
Having said all of this, I do agree that the use of
warrants against the news media could be abused in a way
that impinged First Amendment Rights.

It is not easy to

formulate a guiding principle, consistent with the Fourth
Amendment and protection of First Amendment rights under all
circumstances.

I am inclined to think that the SG's views

again reflect the appropriate answer - although one not free
from the risk of some abuse.

As suggested by the SG, we

should adhere to the pro~ions of the warrant clause which
always have depended, initially, upon the discretion of law
enforcement authorities in requesting a warrant and - more

4.

fundamentally - upon the detached judgment of a neutral
magistrate.
Where First Amendment rights are implicated (search
against media premises), the SG suggests that a magistrate
may and should consider (i) the nature of the place to be
searched, (ii) the nature of the items to be seized, (iii)
the importance of these items to law enforcement, and (iv)
as a matter of discretion, whether other less intrusive
means

(~-~.,

a subpoena) would be as effective as a warrant.

Moreover, a magistrate would have authority to
restrict the manner and conditions of a warranted search to
minimize the degree of intrusion.

It may be important to

indicate that in the case of press searches the magistrate,
because of First Amendment considerations, should be more
attentive to the need for limiting the conditions of
execution.

t- 1-~

L.F.P., Jr.
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JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

January 23, 1978
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE

Re:

No. 76-1484, Zurcher v. The Stanford Daily
No. 76-1600, Bergna v. The Stanford Daily

I

vote to affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. On

the record below, the search was impermissible under the First
and Fourth Amendments.

At the very least, before the police

can institute a general search of a newspaper office, there
must be some showing that evidence would be destroyed if a
subpoena were issued instead of a search warrant. The Fourth
Amendment protection against "unreasonable" searches may
require the same showing whenever evidence is sought from a
third party.

T.M.
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